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DOCUMENT RETENTION AND DESTRUCTION

I. Introduction
Business enterprises are generating an increasing number of documents.
The filing, storage, retrieval and eventual destruction of those documents are
time-consuming and expensive, and may have civil and criminal ramifications.
Because of the increasing volume of business records, the rising cost of
documents retention, and the possible consequences of destruction, records
management has become a senior management concern needing expert legal
guidance.
Some corporations have chosen to search their files and destroy selected
documents only when some event suggests a particular need to remove certain
documents.' However, a survey has indicted that, in contrast to ad hoc search
and destroy operations, a growing number of corporations have regular document retention-destruction programs and the retention period for the average
2
record has become progressively shorter.
Since antitrust cases are usually based primarily on documents, antitrust
counsel advise the adoption of a regular records retention-destruction program
under which entire categories of business documents are destroyed at the
earliest practical time after creation without regard to the contents of any
specific document. 3 Establishing the earliest practical time for destruction is
difficult given business needs and the statutes and regulations which specify
what records must be kept, who must keep them and for how long. Those
responsible for drafting, instituting and administering a records retention program encounter various legal problems.
Whether a company has an ad hoc search and destroy operation or a
regular records retention program, management and counsel must consider a
federal criminal statutory scheme which renders the destruction of documents
illegal if it interferes with judicial, administrative or legislative investigations or
proceedings. Three obstruction ofjustice statutes4 and numerous cases must be
considered whenever a corporation wishes to destroy records (1) prior to learning of any investigation or proceeding in which the documents might be relevant, (2) after learning of relevant government inquiry but before being contacted by authorities, (3) in the course of voluntary cooperation with government authorities, or (4) after process requiring the production of documents
has been served.
Although there is presently no federal statute that specifically provides
criminal sanctions for the wrongful destruction of documents or physical
evidence, pending Senate and House of Representative bills 5 proposing reform
of the federal criminal laws include specific provisions relating to the destruction of documents and physical evidence. If enacted, the provisions would
clarify ambiguities regarding the wrongful destruction of documents under the
1 R. Borow and S. Baskin, The Internal CorporateInvestigation: Destructionof Documents and Routine Record
Retention Programs,Prac. L. Inst. Seminar on The Internal Corporate Investigation, Course Materials at 209
(1980).
2 AMERICAN Soc'Y OF CORP. SECRETARIES, INC., SURVEY OF RECORDS RETENTION PRACTICES 2 (1971).
3 Baker, The Control of Documents, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 35 (1979).
4

18 U.S.C. §5 1503, 1505, 1510 (1976). The relevant portions of these sections are set out in notes

69-71, infra.
5 S. 1722, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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present obstruction of justice statutes, establish when routine document
destruction is a defense to criminal allegations, and impose stiffer penalties on
those convicted of violations.
If a party to a civil proceeding has destroyed records, a negative inference
may be drawn from that fact and exploited for its prejudicial value at trial.
Principles of evidence enable an adverse, but rebuttable, inference to be drawn
concerning the strength of a party's case if evidence was deliberately destroyed
6
to prevent its use in litigation.
Answering document destruction questions is often difficult. Counsel is
confronted with a maze of laws requiring records maintenance and with
obscure obstruction ofjustice statutes and case law prohibiting destruction that
interferes with government investigations or proceedings. Determining the requirements of particular record maintenance regulations and determining
whether an investigation or proceeding is foreseeable or pending are formidable tasks.
Although the A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility contains no
single provision pertaining to destruction of evidence, it forbids recommending
conduct which violates any law. Several ethical considerations and disciplinary
rules read together establish that an attorney may not counsel a client to
destroy records when such destruction would constitute a criminal offense.
However, it is not unethical for an attorney to recommend destroying
documents when the client may do so legally. Proposed Code revisions include
specific rules forbidding lawyers from counseling the destruction of documents
when they reasonably should know that the records are relevant to a pending or
7
clearly foreseeable proceeding.
This article discusses the practical, legal and ethical considerations involved in document destruction. The article also suggests procedures for drafting, instituting, and administering systematic records management programs.
II. Legal Requirements to Retain Documents
Federal, state, municipal and foreign laws specify what records must be
kept, who must keep them and for how long. In many instances, particularly
with reference to state, municipal and foreign jurisdictions, the statutes and
regulations are either ambiguous or silent regarding the specific records a
business must keep and the period they must be retained. Because determining
the diverse requirements of multiple jurisdictions is difficult, counseling that a
particular records retention schedule complies with legal requirements is
precarious. If the retention schedule does not meet requirements and
documents are prematurely destroyed, fines and other adverse consequences
may result.
A. Federal
As of January 1980, there were over 1,300 federal statutes and regula6
7

See section V, part A, Adverse Evidentiary Inference, infra.
The relevant portions of these proposals are set out when they are discussed in the text, infra.
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tions 8 requiring the retention of documents for periods of time ranging from
seven days to permanently, with most requiring retention for three to five
years. Many such laws leave retention periods unspecified or indefinite. For
example, one tax regulation requires that tax records be preserved for as long
as is necessary to compute liability and justify it to the government. 9
Each new statute and regulation requiring document retention imposes
new record-keeping burdens on the affected parties.1 0 Authority to impose such
burdens, which the Supreme Court of the United States upheld in 1940,11 is
based on the commerce clause of the Constitution. Federal record-keeping requirements fall into three categories: (1) statutes or regulations applicable to all
United States businesses; (2) regulations applicable to regulated industries;
and (3) regulations applicable to specific records of particular businesses.
Laws applicable to all United States businesses are exemplified by the
record-keeping provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and the Fair Labor
Standards Act. 12 Unregulated businesses subject to these provisions find compliance with them difficult, because the provisions often fail to specify retention
periods or the classes of records to which they apply. In such circumstances, the
requirements contained in schedules promulgated for regulated businesses may
be useful as guides to reasonable retention periods, and a company's compliance with them in establishing retention periods may indicate its own good
13
faith.
Stringent regulations applicable to railroads, banks, public utilities and
other regulated industries require companies to prepare and keep for several
years a variety of records relating to their business.1 4 Some agencies responsible for these regulations have codified their record-keeping requirements and

8

See Guide to Record Retention Requirements (revised as of January 1, 1980), Special Edition of the

FEDERAL REGISTER, for a digest of provisions relating to record-keeping requirements imposed by the
various federal laws and agencies. See also CONTROLLERSHIP FOUNDATION, INC., CORPORATE RECORDS RETENTION, A GUIDE TO U.S. FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS (R. Wheelan, ed. 1958); Costello, Records Washington Wants

You to Keep, 64 NATION'S BUSINESS 4 (Oct. 1976); Your Business Records: A Simplified Guide to What Records You
Must Keep and How Long You Must Keep Them (Prentice-Hall 1977).
9 Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(a) (1980).
10 In Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), Justice Frankfurter observed:
Virtually every major public law enactment-to say nothing of State and local legislation-has
record-keeping provisions. In addition to record-keeping requirements, is the network of provisions for filing reports. Exhaustive efforts would be needed to track down all the statutory
authority, let alone the administrative regulations, for record-keeping and reporting requirements. Unquestionably they are enormous in volume.

Id. at 51.
11 In United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1940), the Court upheld the validity of the record-keeping
requirements of the wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Justice Stone wrote:
Since . . . Congress may require production for interstate commerce to conform to . . . [pre-

scribed] conditions, it may require the employer, as a means of enforcing the valid law, to keep a
record showing whether he has in fact complied with it. The requirement of records even of the
intrastate transaction is an appropriate means to the legitimate end.
Id. at 125. The Court added in EndicottJohnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943), that the informa-

tion sought must not be "plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose" of the agency. Id. at 509.
12 29 U.S.C. § 201-219 (1976).
13 CONTROLLERSHIP FOUNDATION, INC., supra note 8, at viii.
14 Domanico and Leverette, Shared Project Studies: Revises Hospital Record Retention Policies, 52 J. AM.
HOSPITAL A. 133 (May 1978); Lagerstrom, A Retention ProgramforInsuranceRecords, 4 RECORDS MANAGEMENT
Q. 19 (July 1970); Jensen and Larson, Records Managementfor Pollution Abatement Programs, Meeting EPA Requirements, 61 MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 37 (March 1980); Murphy and Murphy, Keep Those Bank Records
Under Control, 160 BANKERS MAGAZINE 71 (Winter 1977); SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, GUIDE TO
RECORD RETENTION REQUIREMENTS FOR SMALL BUSINESS (1979).
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published them in special bulletins. Specially regulated companies are also subject to the general federal requirements.
Regulations directed at limited categories of businesses requiring specific
documents to be retained 5 are typified by the regulation requiring wool product manufacturers to keep for three years records of the various fibers used in
16
their products.
B. State and Municipal
Each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia have statutes and
regulations which establish record-keeping requirements. These requirements
are uniform in only a few areas. 17 In areas such as tax, unemployment and
workmen's compensation, the requirements are especially diverse and extensive. Consequently, large corporations may find themselves compelled to
review the laws of all 51 jurisdictions in order to ensure complete compliance.
Because many state agencies have regulatory power, it is often difficult to
determine specific record-keeping requirements without consulting local
records or the agency staff. No state has digested its record-keeping laws and
regulations as has the federal government, although there are several limited
digests of state laws affecting document retention.' 8
Most municipalities in the United States have some record retention requirements, such as requirements that local businesses maintain sales records
and various building and construction documents. There are no digests of such
regulations. 19
C. Foreign
All foreign laws regulating businesses include some record-keeping requirements.2 0 However, in general they do not mandate maintenance of
records to the extent that domestic laws do. Developed countries impose retention requirements on all businesses in at least the categories of taxation, labor,
trade and commerce. Many developed countries also have requirements pertaining to particular industries or business activities, such as aeronautics,
15 D. LEE & J. LEE, AGRIBUSINESS PROCEDURES AND RECORDS (McGraw-Hill 1979).
16 Guide to Record Retention Requirements, supra note 8, at 50.
17 There are several uniform state record-keeping laws, including the Uniform Preservation of Private
Business Records Act, enacted by the states of Illinois, Maryland, New Hampshire and Oklahoma, and the
Uniform Photographic Copies of Business and Public Records as Evidence Act, enacted in 47 states and the

District of Columbia.
18 See CONTROLLERSHIP

FOUNDATION, INC., CORPORATE RECORDS RETENTION, A GUIDE TO REQUIREMENTS OF STATE GOVERNMENTS OF THE U.S. (R. Wheelan, ed. 1960). Although 20 years old, this 1,022
page volume contains the only thorough analysis of state laws and regulations which bear on record-keeping

requirements, and may be a helpful starting point in canvassing the current laws. See also RECORDS CONTROLS, INC., RETENTION AND PRESERVATION OF RECORDS WITH DESTRUCTION SCHEDULES 37-48 (9th
1977); NJ. STATE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, N.J. BUSINESS RECORD RETENTION REQUIREMENTS (1970).

19

See generally Note, Records Management in Government, 12 RECORDS MANAGEMENT

Q.

ed.

44 (April 1978).

20 INTERNATIONAL RECORDS MANAGEMENT FED'N, INTERNATIONAL RECORDS RETENTION SURVEY (1980);
CONTROLLERSHIP FOUNDATION, INC., CORPORATE RECORDS RETENTION, A GUIDE TO CANADIAN FEDERAL AND
PROVINCIAL REQUIREMENTS (R. Wheelan, ed. 1959); C. JONES, BRITAIN AND THE DOMINIONS: A GUIDE TO
BUSINESS AND RELATED RECORDS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM CONCERNING AUSTRALIA, CANADA, NEW ZEALAND

AND SOUTH AFRICA (G. K. Hall 1978); Aoki and Yamashita, Development of Records Management inJapan, 12
RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 57 (April 1978); Tall, Records Systems in Developing Countriesand Organizationsin the
South Paific, 9 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 28 (July 1975).
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agriculture, banking and drugs. Less developed countries have record-keeping
requirements in taxation, trade and commerce, although few have requirements pertaining to particular industries or business activities. In many of
the less developed nations it is difficult to determine specific record-keeping requirements without consulting local records or officials.
III. Document Retention-Destruction Programs
Some managements do not understand why the company must keep certain
documents, what documents it must keep, where it must keep them and who
must know where they are. On the other hand, because of the increased
volume of corporate documents, the cost of their retention and the possible
consequences of their destruction, senior managements have begun to
recognize that exposure to civil and criminal liability, as well as great loss of
time and money, may result from faulty and cumbersome records management.2 1 These managements are directing their attention to storage of vital
records on microfilm or microfiche, rather than of more expensive hard copy,
and to disposal of other documents in accordance with retention-destruction
programs.
Many records stored have no value, and those retained for legal or
business purposes can be stored in an efficient fashion in locations where
storage cost is less than the cost of office space. A cost can be placed on filing
and storing records.2 2 As a result, many companies are formulating their own
records management programs to provide a cost-efficient and systematic approach to document retention and destruction.
Document retention-destruction programs vary in sophistication. Many
enterprises have no routine program, but engage in document destruction from
time to time when additional filing space is needed. These companies catalogue
documents for either permanent retention or destruction at an unspecified
time. Documents in the latter category are destroyed when a subsequent file
audit reveals that additional space is needed, or that the documents are obsolete. Under this type of unorganized program, there is no attempt to assure
that all copies of documents have been destroyed or that documents which
23
must be maintained pursuant to applicable laws have been preserved.
Some companies search their files and destroy sensitive documents only
when some event (such as an internal investigation) suggests a particular need
for their removal. 24 Other companies focus on retaining, digesting and cataloging documents in a way which minimizes storage and retrieval costs; their decisions regarding document destruction are ad hoc and intermittent. These com21 Brekka, Rockwell and Brooks, The Executive Viewpoint of Records Management, 3 RECORDS MANAGEMENT
Q. 5 (Oct. 1969); Schwartz, Records Management Top Concern if Top Management, 16 DATA MANAGEMENT 38
(Nov. 1978).
22 U.S. COMM'N ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOV'T (HOOVER COMMISSION), TASK FORCE REPORTS, Appendix C (1949).
23 R. Borow and S. Baskin, supra note 1, at 212-13.
24 Block and Barton, Internal Corporate Investigations: Maintainingthe Confidentiality of a Corporate Client's
Communications with Investigative Counsel, 35 Bus. LAW. 5 (1979); Fedders, Corporate Criminal Responsibility-Conductingan Internal Investigation, in 3 CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES, ch. 62 (Matthew Bender
1979); PARALLEL GRAND JURY AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS (N. Kaplan, P. Friedman, R.
Bennett & H. Trainor, eds.) (A.B.A. 1980).
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panies might retain some documents in hard copy form, others on microfilm or
microfiche, and still others in a computer retrieval system. Finally, a few document retention programs have as their sole purpose the gathering of documents
supporting corporate compliance and accountability programs.
Most enterprises have an established document retention plan based upon
both government record-keeping requirements and business needs. In such a
program, requirements are established and administered to ensure that
documents are filed in an appropriate place, the number of copies distributed is
catalogued, and the documents are retrieved and destroyed on pre-established
"pull" dates. Such a program involves the routine destruction, after a
specified period of time, of categories of documents without reference to their
specific content. 25 It is this type of program that antitrust advisors recommend
companies adopt as part of "preventive maintenance" against antitrust ex26
posure.
The objective of a routine program is to ensure that: (1) documents that
must be maintained in accordance with applicable laws and regulations are
preserved as long as necessary; (2) documents necessary for the conduct of
business are filed in a systematic manner and are accessible when necessary;
(3) documents relevant to foreseeable or pending judicial, administrative, or
congressional investigations or proceedings are identified and preserved; (4)
documents that must be maintained permanently are catalogued and reduced
to microfilm or microfiche for easy storing or access; and (5) all other
documents are destroyed. Because significant time and manpower is required
to organize document management programs and supervise their implementation, such plans are expensive and time-consuming.
A. Selective Destruction Versus a Routine Destruction Program
The decision whether to adopt a formal records management program or
to rely on ad hoc destruction depends upon the particular needs and legal
vulnerability of the enterprise. 27 If a company generates relatively few
documents and even fewer which are sensitive in nature, its management may
decide that the cost of a documents management program outweighs its potential benefits. On the other hand, if a corporation generates a plethora of
documents, its management may decide that indiscriminate retention results in
high storage costs and possible exposure to litigation. In such a case management will likely order routine destruction pursuant to a records management
program, unless such a program would be ineffective given the company's
25

R. Borow and S. Baskin, supra note 1, at 212-16.

26 Baker, supra note 3, at 36-37; Toll and Bauer, The CorporateAntitrust Audit-Establishing a Document
Retention Program, 19 PRAc. LAW. 5-15 (1973); Anderson, Effective Antitrust Compliance Programsand Procedures
(An Outline), 18 Bus. LAW. 739 (1963); Whiting, Antitrust and the CorporateExecutive (pt. 2), 48 VA. L. REV. 1
(1962); Beckstrom, Destruction of Documents with Federal Antitrust Significance, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 687 (1966)
(suggesting a federal antitrust document retention statute); J. VAN OiSE & C. DUNN, HOW TO COMPLY WITH
THE ANTITRUST LAWS 340 (1954); Freedman, Antitrust: The Education of a Client, 17 Bus. LAW. 321 (1962); B.
Lipson, The Government Inquiry-Antitrust Compliance Programs: A Boon or Bane for the Business Client, A.B.A.

Nat'l Inst. on Antitrust Counseling and the Marketing Process, Course Materials at 513 (1980).
27

See generally R. Borow and S. Baskin, supra note 1, and Baker, supra note 3. See alsoJ. Fedders, Destruc-

tion of CorporateDocuments and Records, A.B.A. Nat'l Inst. on Defending Corporations and Their Officers in
Parallel Proceedings, Course Materials at 294 (1980); M. Tierney, Document Retention Program, Prac. L. Inst.
Seminar on The Internal Corporate Investigation, Course Materials at 247 (1980).
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structure and the proliferation of copies of documents. 28 In deciding whether to
adopt an ad hoc approach or a record retention program, management should
weigh the flexibility which each approach provides. Management should be
especially attentive to which approach provides greater leeway to destroy
documents within the confines of legal restraints.
B. Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantages of a written document retention program which is
uniformly complied with by all personnel include: (1) the elimination of the
onerous expense of storage of irrelevant and obsolete documents; (2) a reduction in the burden and cost of retrieval of documents in response to business requests, government investigations or litigation; (3) a substantial reduction of
legal risks flowing from documents, particularly those which are hastily
drafted, erroneous or misleading; and (4) the avoidance of an adverse inference
29
from the nonproduction of documents in litigation.
The disadvantages of such a program include: (1) the expense of
establishing and administering a program including the commitment of human
and capital resources needed to assure compliance; (2) the inability to prove a
fact affirmatively because documents have been destroyed; (3) a diminished
flexibility of response to formal and informal requests for documents; (4) the
adverse inferences arising from incomplete compliance with the program; (5)
the adverse inferences arising from selective destruction outside the boundaries
of the program (selective destruction appearing less corrupt without a program); and (6) other adverse legal effects, including the discoverability of the
30
program.
In the absence of a record retention program any destruction of
documents is selective. Such destruction appears suspicious when viewed in
retrospect. Document destruction which takes place routinely pursuant to a
regular program is less likely to give rise to adverse inferences should such
3
destruction later become an issue. 1
C. Drafting, Instituting and Administering a Program
Establishing a documents management program is an expensive and timeconsuming undertaking.3 2 The preparation and adoption of a program is the
responsibility of operating management; action by the board of directors is not
28

R. Borow and S. Baskin, supra note 1, at 215-16; B. Lipson, supra note 26.

29

M. Tierney, supra note 27, at 250.

30 Id.
31 See section V, Practical Considerations Relevant to the Destruction of Documents, infra.
32 Bishop, Establishinga Records Management Program, 88 THE OFFICE 213 (Oct. 1978); CONTROLLERSHIP
FOUNDATION, INC., CASE STUDIES IN RECORDS RETENTION AND CONTROL (1957); Evans, Records Retention
Tips, 11 INFORMATION & RECORDS MANAGEMENT 26 (Mar. 1977); Hatfield, How to Establish an Effective
Records Retention System, 61 MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 55 (March 1980); Hill, Guidelinesto Record Retention, 1
PERSPECTIVE 27 (Fall/Winter 1975); Klein and Watson, The Whys andHows of Record Retention, 39 MORTGAGE
BANKER 63 (April 1979); Oliva, A Profilefor Developing a Records Retention Program, 12 RECORDS MANAGEMENT
Q. 29 (April 1978); Simpson, The Don'ts of a Good Records Management Program, 9 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q.
20 (Jan. 1975); Springer, A Surve/Guide to Record Retention & Destruction, 11 INFORMATION & RECORDS
MANAGEMENT 23 (Mar. 1977); Wilds, Making Records Retention Decisions, 82 THE OFFICE 73 (Oct. 1975).
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required. Management may hire records management consultants to under33
take the necessary interviews and research and to draft the program.
During the preparation process, those responsible for drafting and instituting the program meet with representatives of the company and each of its
divisions or subsidiaries to obtain recommendations and comments. Some
large companies, instead of preparing one program, have each profit center,
division or subsidiary prepare its own program. Others create specific programs to deal with specific subjects-for example, an antitrust compliance program setting forth antitrust document retention policies and a product liability
program establishing guidelines for retention of product quality and safety
documents.

34

The elements of a document management policy include statements of applicability, responsibilities, and minimal requirements. 3 5 The most complex
aspects of establishing a program are listing categories of documents and determining periods of retention.3 6 Some companies list by name each document to
be retained or destroyed, while others prefer to list functional groups of
documents. A comprehensive records program includes the following requirements:
(1) all records are retained for at least the minimum period stated in applicable statutes and regulations;
(2) all records affecting obligations of the company are retained for a period of
time assuring their availability when needed;
(3) records are made and maintained substantiating compliance with relevant
laws;
(4) document destruction occurs pursuant to a standard policy developed for
business reasons so that the company cannot be accused of deliberately
destroying records in anticipation of a specific problem;
(5) destruction procedures include a mechanism which permits management
to halt the destruction of records (a) upon receipt of service of legal process
requiring production of documents, (b) upon learning of a relevant
government inquiry, or (c) during the course of voluntary cooperation
with governmental authorities;
(6) vital records are identified and safeguarded;37 and
38
(7) the privacy and security of records are appropriately assured.
Once a program has been adopted, a policy and procedure manual is cir33 Professional records management consultants will study routines, establish centralized control of
records, create indexes, draft record retention programs, conduct seminars and prepare manuals of procedures. A directory of professional records management consultants may be obtained from the Association
of Records Managers and Administrators, Inc.
34 Records Retention-The Lawyer's Role, 9 THE LAWYER'S BRIEF 5-1, 5-21 (W. Hancock, ed. 1979).
35 Id. at 5-20.
36 Id. at 5-21 to 5-36. These pages contain a sample retention policy or procedure and a sample records
retention guide including suggested retention periods for certain types of documents. See also Thomas Wilds
Associates Inc., Records Retention and Files Management, Course Materials at ch. 2 (1980).
37 In addition to preserving records for legal and business needs, some enterprises are initiating archives where historical documents of enduring value are safeguarded. See T. SCHELLENBERG, MODERN ARCHIVES: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES (University of Chicago Press 1956); Cushman, Using Business History,
11 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 5 (July 1977); Davidson, Selling Management on Business Archives, 3 RECORDS
MANAGEMENT Q. 15 (July 1969); Kurtz, Business Archives in the CorporateFunction, 4 RECORDS MANAGEMENT
Q. 5 (April 1970); Matthews, The Archives of The Coca-Cola Company, 9 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 9 (July
1975); Orgain, Starting a Company Archives, 8 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 9 (Jan. 1974); Jaroslovsky, Energy
Department,Just 2Y2 Years Old, Has Own Historian, Wall St. J., Aug. 26, 1980, at 1, col. 4.
38 Records Retention-The Lawyers Role, supra note 34, at 5-22.
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culated to alert employees to the program's existence, the responsibilities it im39
poses on them, and the sanctions prescribed for noncompliance.
Evenhandedness and consistency are important if the program is to work effectively. Thus, in each department or location a committee or representative is
designated to monitor the program, assure compliance with its timetables, and
ascertain that destruction does not violate applicable law. In large corporations, the number of employees engaged in administering the program and
performing related clerical duties may exceed several dozen, exclusive of
secretaries. 40 The effectiveness of employee compliance with the program
depends largely upon the extent of management's support for the program.
Canvassing Applicable Laws. -The first step in establishing a document
management program is to analyze the statutes and regulations applicable to
the corporation and each of its divisions and subsidiaries. 41 Each of the jurisdictions in which the corporation operates sets forth its own requirements regarding the records a business must keep and the period for which they must be retained. Management desiring to comply with these requirements often finds
them both inconsistent and ambiguous. For example, there may be a subtle
difference between a requirement specifying that records must be kept in
perpetuity and one which provides only that records must be kept, or be kept as
long as necessary. In order to determine what constitutes a reasonable period
of retention, managers refer to requirements of other regulations applied to
similar classes of records by other government agencies. However, these requirements are themselves often inconsistent or indeterminate, so that cautious
management and counsel decide to keep records permanently. Such a decision
is often unnecessary and, in view of the volume of paperwork incident to
42
today's business operations, always costly.
Organizing Documents. -Once a retention timetable has been established
which comports with legal and business requirements, uniform organization of
files must be undertaken. Categories of documents, defined by document type
or organizational unit, must be established and each category must be assigned
pull dates. 43 The filing system should be designed so that no sorting need be
done on the pull date.
In order to establish complete control of records, the location of all document storage facilities must be ascertained.4 4 Employees' personal files must
not be overlooked, since corporate records are discoverable regardless of where
the files containing them are located. 45 Thus if an employee's files contain
documents relating to the corporation's business, they must be included in the
39 Hogan, Office Management Manuals, 14 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 32 (April 1980).
40 Witt, Role of Secretaries in Records Management, 12 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 40 (Jan. 1978).
41 Murray, Legal Considerationsin Records Management, 12 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 25 (Jan. 1978).
42 CONTROLLERSHIP FOUNDATION, INC., supra note 8, at iv.
43 The following include a survey of, or suggested retention periods for, certain common business
papers: Records Retention-The Lawyer's Role, supra note 34, at 5-24 to 5-33; AMERICAN SOC'Y OF CORP.
SECRETARIES, INC. 1979 RECORDS RETENTION 7-12 (1979); RECORDS CONTROLS, INC., supra note 18, at 51-77.

Cross, Inventorying and Scheduling Records, 7 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 28 (April 1973); T.
supra note 37, at 52-64.
45 McKenna, The ConstitutionalProtection of Private Papers: The Role of a HierarchicalFourthAmendment, 53
IND. LJ. 55 (1977); Mahon, Privileged CommunicationsandSelf-Incrimination, 32 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 1251
(1974); Comment, A Paper Chase: The Search and Seizure of Personal Business Records, 43 BROOKLYN L.R. 489
(1976); Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. CMI. L.
44

SCHELLENBERG,

REv. 687 (1951).
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program. These and all other files and documents must then be indexed and
classified; the indices and classifications must be kept current. Excluding the
documents of even a single corporate office, division, subsidiary or employee
46
from the program may prove almost worse than having no program.
Storage and Retrieval.-Storage and retrieval of documents is vital to the
success of a records management program. Although analysis of document
storage and retrieval systems transcends the scope of this article, development
47
of such a system requires a thorough understanding of forms management,
49
files and correspondence management, 48 filing equipment and office layout,
52
5t
50
microfilm and microfiche systems, reproduction control, word processing,
information retrieval, 3 automated scheduling, 54 computer-records
56
55
management and records centers.
Establishing "Pull" Dates.-The next step in the creation of a records
management program is to specify retention schedules for each category of
documents established. 5 7 Although statutorily specified retention periods are

46 Baker, supra note 3, at 37.
47 Bubnash, ObtainingMaximum Benefits from Forms Management, 2 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 15 (Jan.
1968); W. MAEDKE, M. ROBEK & G. BROWN, INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT 233-74 (Glencoe
Press 1974).
48 T. SCHELLENBER, supra note 37, at 79-93; Westington, Case Records Filing System, 10 RECORDS
MANAGEMENT Q. 9 (April 1976).
49 Dunn, Selection of Filing Equipment, 10 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 21 (July 1976).
50 Brown, The Microfilm Feasibility Study, 8 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 32 (Oct. 1974); Brown,
Microforms, 9 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 32 (Jan. 1975); Brown, Anatomy of Micrographics, 9 RECORDS
MANAGEMENT Q. 31 (April 1975); Brown, COM OperationsandSystems, 9 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 34 (July
1975); Brown, Roll Microfilm Applications, 9 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 30 (Oct. 1975); W. MAEDKE, M.
ROBEK & G. BROWN, supra note 47, at 363-414; Thomas Wilds Associates Inc., supra note 36, at ch. 4.
Generally, any business record which would be admissible in court in its original form will be admissible if it
is on microfilm. See 28 U.S.C. 9 1732(b) (1976); See also Brereton, The Admissibility in Evidence of Microfilm
Records, 59 A.B.A. J. 500 (1973); Records Retention-The Lawyer's Role, supra note 34, at 5-12; Admissibility of
Videotape Copies of Documents in Evidence, 1 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 29 (April 1967). Rev. Proc. 76-43, 2
C.B. 667 (1976) sets forth the conditions under which microfilm or microfiche will be considered books and
records within the meaning of I.R.C. 5 6001.
51 W. MAEDKE, M. ROBEK & G. BROWN, supra note 47, at 415-28.
52 Thomas, Word Processing-A New Conceptfor Records Managers, 10 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 27 (April
1976).
53 Mackay, Information Retrieval Systems, 9 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 22 (Jan. 1975).
54 Benedon, Automated Scheduling/Records Center Operations, 14 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 18 (April 1980).
55 Grundman, Records Management and the Computer, 14 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 14 (April 1980);
Lorek, The Computer Programmer-A Helpmate to the Records Manager, 1 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 16 (July
1967); Porter, The Changing World of Information Management, 14 INFORMATION & RECORDS MANAGEMENT 13
(May 1980); Seiberling, Computer PackageforRecords Management, 9 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 13 (July 1975);
Simon, Fully Automated Records Management, 29 J. SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT 6 (May 1978); Wright, The Unfinished Symphony, 6 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 5 (Jan. 1972).
56 Benedon, Features of New Records Center Buildings, I RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 14 (Jan. 1967); W.
MAEDKE, M. ROBEK & G. BROWN, supra note 46, at 292-320.
57 Andreassen, Records Retirement: Retention, Scheduling andStorage, 6 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 21 (July
1972); Courtney, A Blueprintfor Record Retention Scheduling, 14 INFORMATION & RECORDS MANAGEMENT 23
(Feb. 1980); Daskal, Record Retention: What to Save, What to Toss, 8 AGENCY SALES MAGAZINE 12 (Sept. 1978);
Mitchell, Records Retention Schedules, 28 J. SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT 6 (Aug. 1977).
A records manager engages in a "records appraisal process" in established retirement periods. The
process involves evaluation of two criteria, namely, value assessment and risk benefit assessment.
Value assessment involves evaluating the primary and secondary values of a given group ofdocuments.
The primary value of a group of records relates to the purpose for which they were created. Secondary value
relates to uses of the records for purposes other than for which they were created. There are several kinds of
subject values. Administrative and operational uses or values fall into the primary category, and fiscal,
legal, research, historical or archival uses of values fall into the secondary category. In the process of appraisal of records to assess their values, the records manager identifies and defines the nature of each of these
values and the point in time at which those values expire. Based upon reference activities and other factors,
the records manager assesses the degree of usage of a group of records during each phase of their life cycle,
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necessary starting points for establishing these schedules, the statutory periods
may be lengthened based on business needs and common sense. Augmenting
factors might include accepted business practice, storage space limitations, and
the need for personal access to documents.58 Pull or destruction dates should be
established only after management and the affected departments have been
surveyed for their recommendations. 5 9
Administering the Program.-Administration of a records management program bears little resemblance to the toil of the file room clerk of past decades.
Modern records managers are professionals, 60 able to communicate with
counsel, management and employees of all levels. They are trained in management principles, program organization, forms design and control,
micrographic technology and systems, systems analysis, word processing, and
data processing.6 ' Several universities and junior colleges have programs pro6 2
viding concentrated study in records management.
D. Waiver and Suspension
After a records management program is implemented, business or legal
reasons may arise for either waiving the pull dates of certain documents or
suspending the entire program. For example, when an enterprise learns that
the government is investigating its activities or receives a document demand or
subpoena, it must suspend that portion of its destruction program affecting
records relevant to the investigation or covered by the document request. An
effective program includes a procedure for dealing with these contingencies.
Many programs have such a procedure. Upon receipt of a subpoena, preprepared memoranda or telexes are immediately sent to employees advising
them not to destroy any documents. After counsel determines the scope of the
namely, from their creation through their uses in an active office environment and until the expiration of
their value or secondary purposes, at which time destruction can be contemplated if the records have no
long-term value for research, historical or archival purposes. This concept of value assessment did not
originate with the records management profession. It originated with the archival profession.
The second criterion of the records appraisal process is risk benefit assessment. Here the records
manager attempts to assess the risks and benefits associated with records destruction. Legal and economic
conditions are considered. Applicable laws and regulations pertaining to records retention are researched. If
there are none, or if operational needs exceed government requirements, the records manager assesses the
potential for the records being utilized in legal proceedings.
From a conceptual standpoint, the subject of record destruction cannot be approached by taking into
account every conceivable contingency. If this approach were followed, the records manager would destroy
few files. Economic and managerial considerations dictate that excessive amounts of money not be expended
in storing records unnecessarily.
See T. SCHELLENBERG, supra note 37, at 26-32; T. SCHELLENBERG, THE MANAGEMENT OF ARCHIVES (Columbia University Press 1965).
58
59

See note 43, supra.
AMERICAN Soc'y OF CORP. SECRETARIES, supra note 43, at 14.

60 Professional organizations of records managers include the Association of Records Managers and
Administrators, Inc. and the International Records Management Federation. Seegenerally Maedke, Records

Management Profession: Status and Trends, 10 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 42 (July 1976); McLellan, Creating
Management Awarenessfor a Records Management Profession, 10 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 10 (July 1976).

61 The Institute of Certified Records Managers certifies records managers by examination. The CRM
certification is designed as a measure of professional competence in the records management field. See
Robek, Strategiesfor Passing the CRM Examination, 12 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 38 (Oct. 1978); Benedon,
ProfessionalStatus Through Certification, 12 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 30 (Jan. 1978).

62

See Association of Records Managers and Administrators, Inc. and the Institute of Certified Records

Managers, Directoy of Educational Institutions Teaching Records Management, 13 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 41
(Oct. 1979); Bennett & Fujita, CollegiateEducationfor Records Management-A Challengeforthe 70's, 5 RECORDS
MANAGEMENT Q. 5 (Oct. 1971).
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subpoena and the required file search, the record destruction program is
reinstated for unrelated areas.
Compliance with waiver and suspension procedures is more difficult to enforce than compliance with any other aspect of a program. When documents
have been subpoenaed and the destruction program has been suspended,
employees must be made aware that requested documents must be produced
and that destruction of such documents is forbidden. In order to protect the
company, employees should be threatened with discharge if they destroy requested documents. If particular employees appear to have motives to destroy
particular documents, immediate steps should be taken to secure those
documents and ensure that the file search is conducted by reliable people. In
some instances it may be wise to secure documents before giving notice of the
subpoena or demand, particularly if management is aware that deliberate
destruction might otherwise occur.
Waiver and suspension procedures are essential to any records management program, since without them it is impossible to interrupt a destruction
program on short notice. The procedures should specify the business and legal
grounds justifying waiver and suspension, the persons qualified to authorize
waiver and suspension, and the method by which waiver and suspension may
be secured, especially following receipt of a subpoena or investigative
demand.63
Although a corporation's legal department is not ordinarily involved in
administering a records management program, many programs provide that
destruction schedules may not be waived or suspended without prior written
approval of counsel. It is difficult to determine whether possible investigations
or legal proceedings warrant suspension of a program, and this decision should
be made only by counsel. For this and other reasons, many corporations assign
one or two in-house lawyers as liaison with the records management depart64
ment.
On occasion counsel will be shown a document which could expose the
corporation to liability if it became available to adverse parties. If the document is not yet scheduled for destruction under the terms of the program,
management may advocate waiver of the program to allow the document to be
promptly destroyed. The immediate consideration is whether there is a pending or foreseeable investigation or proceeding in which the document may be
subpoenaed. If no such investigation is pending or foreseeable, counsel must
review the ethical and legal considerations to determine whether destruction
may be recommended. Finally, counsel must determine whether, if a proceeding is instituted after destruction, a negative inference may be drawn by
reason of the earlier destruction of the document. Because of the risk involved
in selective destruction, counsel will frequently advise that the document be retained and that a contemporaneous explanatory memorandum be placed in the
6
file to dilute, if possible, the sensitive nature of the existing document.

63

M. Tierney, supra note 27, at 251.

64

Records Retention-The Lawyer's Role, supra note 34, at 5-7.

65

Baker, supra note 3, at 42.

[VoL. 56:5]

DOCUMENT RETENTION AND DESTRUCTION

E. EducationalPrograms
Even a well-conceived records management program will be ineffective if
it lacks management support and employee cooperation. Such support and
cooperation will be fostered by a detailed education program at the time of the
program's implementation and by periodic reminders to personnel of the program's importance. 66 Those using the system must be convinced of its value.
In educating corporate employees about a newly adopted records management program, emphasis should be placed on the fact that records dealing with
corporate matters are in no way personal records. Employees should be warned
against using words in their memoranda which cast conduct in an improper
tone, 67 and especially against producing documents which contain false or inaccurate information. For many types of potentially troublesome documents,
such as market studies, business plans and acquisition strategies, employees
should be required to seek legal review during their preparation to ensure that
they are not incriminating. Finally, employees should be told to consult with
counsel when they find errors in a document which will not be destroyed soon,
so that counsel may consider whether a corrective memorandum should be put
in the files. A memorandum created before an investigation or litigation is initiated has greater probative value.
The effectiveness of any program can be undermined by employees squirrelling away corporate documents thinking the documents are their own.
Many companies consider their program effective until they find, after receiving a subpoena, that there are duplicate copies of subpoenaed documents in an
employee's personal file or at his home which the employee erroneously
thought would not be discoverable. Employees must be educated that no document is personal if it concerns an employee's conduct in the course of corporate
business.
IV. Legal Restraints on Destruction of Documents
A. FederalLaw: Obstruction ofJustice
Despite the abundance of laws and regulations requiring document retention, there is at present no federal statute that specifically provides criminal
sanctions for the wrongful destruction of documents or physical evidence.
Destruction of evidence has been prosecuted under the general "obstruction of
justice" and "hindering law enforcement" statutes. These statutes create three
mutually exclusive criminal offenses 68 for interfering with judicial, ad66 Gammie, Records Management Training- Your Company Needs It, 6 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 18 (Oct.
1972); Russell, IntroducingNew Employees to Records Management, 3 RECORDS MANAGEMENT Q. 23 (Jan. 1969);
Baker, supra note 3, at 44.
67 Antitrust advisers counsel that certain words in documents are often indicative of corporate activities
that may have adverse antitrust significance: "destroy after reading," "for your eyes only," "aim to
destroy all competition," "competitors will have no objections or will go along," "exploiting weaknesses of
competitors," "plans to capture a specific market share," and "to you and to you alone, the price is below
cost." See Loughlin, The Naughty Words of Antitrust, 54 A.B.A. J. 246, 247 (1968); Blundell, Confused, Overstuffed Corporate Writing Often Costs Firms Much Time-And Money, Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 1980, at 21, col. 4.
68 United States v. Mitchell, 372 F. Supp. 1239, 1251 (S.D.N.Y.) (statutes are, by their explicit terms,
applicable to different government activities at separate chronological periods), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Stans v. Gagliardi, 485 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1973). Each of these statutes is the subject of a helpful annotation. See Annot., 20 A.L.R. Fed. 731 (1974) (section 1503); Annot., 18 A.L.R. Fed. 875 (1974) (section
1510); Annot. 8 A.L.R. Fed. 893 (1971) (section 1505).
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ministrative or legislative investigations or proceedings. The statutes are 18
U.S.C. § 1503 (Influencing or Injuring Officer, Juror or Witness Generally), 69
18 U.S.C. § 1505 (Obstruction of Proceedings Before Departments, Agencies,
and Committees), 70 and 18 U.S.C. § 1510 (Obstruction of Criminal Investigations). 71 The three statutes describe offenses in broad and ambiguous terms,
and consequently provide few standards for predicting whether particular conduct is criminally culpable.
The chief difference between the statutes lies in the nature and timing of
the proceeding involved: section 1503 applies only to pending judicial actions;
section 1505 applies only after administrative or legislative investigations or
proceedings have commenced; and section 1510 applies prior to an initiated
proceeding, penalizing interferences with the transmission of information to
criminal investigators concerning illegal conduct. 72 Thus, the sections render
culpable destruction of relevant documents (1) after learning of relevant
government inquiry but before contact by authorities, (2) in the course of
voluntary cooperation with government authorities, or (3) after process requiring production of the documents has been served.
1. Section 1503
Section 1503, the general obstruction of justice provision, does not deal
explicitly with destruction of documents. However, the courts have construed
the section to prohibit the willful destruction of documents occurring during an
69

70

71

18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976) provides that:
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force... endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede
any witness, in any court of the United States . . . or corruptly or by threats or force . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1976) imposes the same prohibitions as 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976) to:
[A]ny proceeding pending before any department or agency of the United States, or in connection with any inquiry or investigation being had by either House, or any committee of either
House, or any joint committee of the Congress ...
Whoever, with intent to avoid.., or obstruct compliance ... with any civil investigative demand . . . under the Antitrust Civil Process Act, willfully withholds, misrepresents, removes
from any place, conceals, covers up, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means falsifies any
documentary material . . . which is the subject of such demand; or
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force ... influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors
to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which such
proceeding is being had before such department or agency of the United States, or the due and
proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation is being had by
either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the CongressShall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1510 (1976) provides:
(a) Whoever willfully endeavors by means of bribery, misrepresentation, intimidation, or
force or threats thereof to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information relating
to a violation of any criminal statute of the United States by any person to a criminal investigator

Shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section, the term "criminal investigator" means any individual duly
authorized by a department, agency, or armed force of the United States to conduct or engage in
investigations of or prosecutions for violations of the criminal laws of the United States.
72 D. Smalhz, The Application of the Government's TraditionalWeapons- ObstructionofJustice, Perjury and False
Statements, Mail and Wire Fraud, and Conspiracy-to Corporations and Their Officers, A.B.A. Nat'l Inst. on
Defending Corporations and Their Officers in Parallel Proceedings, Course Materials at 110 (1980).
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ongoing or pending judicial proceeding. 7 3 Beginning with the earliest judicial
interpretations, the section has also been held applicable to grand jury proceedings. 74 The reported document destruction cases brought under section
1503 have almost all involved selective destruction of documents. When
redocuments are destroyed routinely and there is no outstanding document 75
quest or subpoena, it is difficult to establish the necessary criminal intent.
Two issues confront courts deciding the applicability of section 1503.
First, what constitutes "due administration of justice"? Second, what conduct
falls within the statute's scope?
Beginning with the earliest opinions interpreting section 1503 or its
predecessors, the courts have inquired into what proceedings qualify as "due
administration of justice." 76 They have concluded that only ongoing or pending judicial proceedings, conducted by either a federal court or its appendage,
the grand jury, fall within the section's "due administration of justice"
language. 77 Grand jury proceedings are considered pending once the grand
jury is empanelled and subpoenas are issued; 78 federal court proceedings are
79
considered pending once the complaint is filed.
If a grand jury subpoena has not been issued or a complaint has not been
filed, courts generally dismiss cases brought under section 1503.80 The courts
reason that a person unaware of the pendency of a proceeding could not have
the requisite intent to obstruct justice. 81 Thus, the pendency requirement ensures that the accused has notice that any attempt to interfere with the proceeding will subject him to criminal sanctions.8 2 The courts justify their literal
interpretation of "due administration ofjustice" with the maxim that criminal
83
statutes should be strictly construed.
Although the substantive offense of obstruction of justice requires a pend73 United States v. Solow, 138 F. Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
74 United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'don othergrounds, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
75 See D. Smaltz, supra note 72 at 114; Baker, supra note 3, at 38; Beckstrom, supra note 23, at 691; text
accompanying notes 133-34 infra.
76 Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 197 (1893).
77 Id. at 207. See also United States v. Siegel, 152 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 263 F.2d 530 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1012 (1959); accord, United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106, 114
(S.D.N.Y.1959), rev'don othergrounds sub nom. United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960). For
recent opinions that presume grand jury functions are within the statute, see United States v. Campanale,
518 F.2d 352, 366 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v. Ryan,
455 F.2d 728, 734 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Kahn, 366 F.2d 259 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 948
(1966); Shimon v. United States, 352 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
78 United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1975) (investigation assigned to regularly sitting
grand jury, subpoena issued and immunity granted); United States v. Simmons, 444 F. Supp. 500 (E.D.
Pa. 1978). See also Shimon v. United States, 352 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (grand jury remains pending for
purposes of 9 1503 so long as it could have brought valid indictments, even if acting beyond its term). Cf
United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1972) (grand jury no longer pending for S 1503 purposes
when dismissed without knowledge of outstanding agency subpoenas and prior to commencing its own investigation).
79 United States v. Metcalf, 435 F.2d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1970); accord, United States v. Scoratow, 137
F. Supp. 620 (W.D. Pa. 1956). See also United States v.Johnson, 605 F.2d 729, 731 (4th Cir. 1979) (judicial
proceeding remains pending in district court until the disposition of any direct appeal which might result in
a new trial); accord, United States v. Chandler, 604 F.2d 972, 976 (5th Cir. 1979). See also United States v.
Verra, 203 F. Supp. 87, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (section 1503 condemns acts before, during, or after trial).
80 United States v. Simmons, 591 F.2d 206 (3d Cir. 1979) (mere agency investigations without any
judicial component fail to constitute proceedings under § 1503); United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728 (9th
Cir. 1972) (no pending proceeding where grand jury was dismissed without knowledge of an outstanding
agency subpoena, thus no 5 1503 violation for document alteration).
81 Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 207 (1893).
82 Id.
83 Haili v. United States, 260 F.2d 744, 745 (9th Cir. 1958).
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ing proceeding, otherwise punishable conduct which precedes pendency is not
immune from prosecution. In United States v. Perlstein,84 the Third Circuit affirmed convictions for conspiracy to obstruct justice even though the conspirators were not found guilty of the substantive crime of obstruction of
justice. The court stated:
While it is true that the obstruction can arise only when justice is being administered, that is to say when a proceeding is pending, there is nothing to
prevent a conspiracy to obstruct the due administration of justice in a proceeding which becomes pending in the future from being cognizable under
85
section 37 [antecedent of present conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371].
Even prior to this pronouncement, conspiracy to obstruct justice was regarded
86
as an indictable offense at common law.
The courts' inquiry into the nature of conduct prohibited by section 1503
has paralleled their inquiry into the meaning of the section's "due administration ofjustice" language. Some courts have applied the canon of jusdem generis,
inquiring whether the alleged obstructive act sufficiently resembled the acts
enumerated in the statute to be embraced within the statute's general concluding language. 87 Jurisdictions adhering to this canon of construction limit
violations of section 1503 to "conduct designed to interfere with the process of
arriving at an appropriate judgment in a pending case and which would disturb
the ordinary and proper functions of the Court.' '88
Other courts, led by the Second Circuit, have explicitly rejected application of the ejusdem generis principle.8 9 These courts have broadly construed section 1503 to enlarge both the concept of "due administration of justice" and
the methods of interference embraced by the section's final clause. 90 The Fifth
and Eighth Circuits similarly view the statute's general conclusory language as
84 126 F.2d 789 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 678 (1942).
85 Id. at 796.
86 SeeState v. Cassatly, 93 N.J. Super. 111, 225 A.2d 141, 145 (App. Div. 1966) (common law crime of
obstructing justice extends to knowingly interfering with lawfully conducted police investigation regardless
of formal charge or commenced grand jury proceedings). See also Agnew v. Parks, 172 Cal. App. 2d 756,
766, 343 P.2d 118, 124 (1959) (concealing documentary evidence held common law crime of obstructing
justice); People v. Tenerowicz, 266 Mich. 276, 253 N.W. 296, 299 (1934).
87 Id. at 746.
88 Id. (conduct designed to encourage a prisoner to escape from a penitentiary not punishable under S
1503); see also United States v. Metcalf, 435 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1970) (manner in which statute may be
violated is limited to intimidating actions).
89 United States v. Rosner, 352 F. Supp. 915, 918-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), appeal denied sub nom. Rosner v.
Bauman, 497 F.2d 919 (2d Gir. 1974).
90 See, e.g., United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975) (conviction affirmed for concerted effort to persuade witness to remain silent to conceal a conspiracy), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). Accord,
United States v. Fayer, 523 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Turcotte, 515 F.2d 145, 150 (2d Cir.
1975) (conviction based on circumstantial evidence affirmed where defendants fabricated a story knowing of
grand jury inquiry into the same matter), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1032 (1975); United States v. Weiss, 491
F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1974) (destruction, concealment or removal of documents sought by subpoena within §
1503), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974); United States v. Cohn, 425 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1971) (concealment of
denied, 405
information relevant and germane to grand jury's functions supports § 1503 conviction), cert.
U.S. 975 (1972); Bosselman v. United States, 239 F. 82 (2d Cir. 1917) (statute violated by alteration of
books material to grand jury inquiry); United States v. Rosner, 352 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (payment to obtain government documents in connection with pending criminal matter falls within § 1503), appeal denied sub nor. Rosner v. Bauman, 497 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Siegel, 152 F. Supp.
370 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (destruction of subpoenaed notes by an investigating grand jury constitutes an
obstruction of justice), aff'd, 263 F.2d 530 (2d Gir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1012 (1959); United States v.
Solow, 138 F. Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (willful destruction of unsubpoenaed correspondence by person
with reason to believe that pending grand jury would order documents states a § 1503 offense).
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an "omnibus provision," and hold that a broad range of obstructive activity
91
falls within its terms.
All the judicial interperetations of section 1503, including those which
strictly construe the section, make clear that destruction of documentary
evidence falls within the statute's ambit. 92 As the Fifth Circuit recently observed:
Using threats to prevent a grand jury witness from testifying has the
result of destroying evidence; so does the burning of transcripts of that
testimony, and both acts obstruct the administration of justice. The use of
threats against a witness falls under the specific language of section93 1503,
while the destruction of documents comes under the omnibus clause.
The courts' expansive reading of section 1503 is in part attributable to their
perception that the statute serves various goals. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has stated that section 1503 is designed both to protect participants in
specific federal proceedings and to prevent miscarriages of justice. 94 Such
broad objectives invite flexible interpretations of the statute and provide a convenient rationale for enlarging its scope beyond the parameters originally intended by Congress. When a third goal is added, that of fostering the proper
administration of justice, the range of conduct a court may hold violative of
95
section 1503 becomes boundless.
Except for witnesses identified prior to a pending proceeding9 6 and for
agency actions that have "ripened" into judicial proceedings, 97 section 1503
does not apply regardless of the possible obstruction caused by destruction. If a
party destroys a document before a judicial or grand jury proceeding has commenced, the party will probably be insulated from section 1503 liability.
However, the party might still be subject to prosecution under section 1505,
since this provision prohibits destruction during earlier stages of the administration of justice.
91 See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1979) (perjury falls into omnibus provision
of § 1503), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 48 (1980); United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1978)
(violating secrecy of grand jury proceeding by selling transcripts of confidential testimony is prohibited
under omnibus clause of § 1503), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 834 (1978); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621,
631 (5th Cir.) (omnibus clause aims at obstruction of justice itself, regardless of the means (including perjury) used to reach the result), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 (1977); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346,
1359 n. 13 (8th Cir. 1976) (§ 1503 proscribes the directing of threats against witnesses or otherwise impeding
the administration of justice), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). See also D. Smaltz, supra note 72, at 118.
92 See, e.g., United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1975) (limits placed on § 1503 do not
preclude a conviction for deliberately destroying documents sought by a subpoena returnable before a sitting grand jury); accord, United States v. Weiss, 491 F.2d 460 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974);
United States v. Siegel, 152 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y.'1957), aff'd, 263 F.2d 530 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 1012 (1959); United States v. Solow, 138 F. Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
93 United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1334 (5th Cir. 1978).
94 United States v. Metcalf, 435 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1970).
95 Miller v. Hulsey, 347 F. Supp. 192, 196 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
96 For authority that once a witness is identifiable, any subsequent interference may violate § 1503 even
before a judicial proceeding has commenced, see Hunt v. United States, 400 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1968) (fact
that informer was expected to testify at a future proceeding, and had already provided information, sufficed
to trigger § 1503 for interfering with a witness, despite absence of pending action), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021
(1969). Cf. United States v. Perlstein, 126 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1942) (prior to pending proceeding, interferences with witnesses are only punishable as conspiracies to obstruct justice, not substantive offenses).
97 United States v. Simmons, 591 F.2d 206 (3d Cir. 1979); cf United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728 (9th
Cir. 1978) (although agency subpoenas were outstanding, court found no judicial proceeding under § 1503
where grand jury dismissed without knowledge of or involvement in agency investigation).
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2. Section 1505
Section 1505 applies to the obstruction of agency and congressional proceedings. It also contains provisions relating to the Antitrust Civil Process
Act, 98 which subjects to criminal liability anyone who destroys or otherwise
conceals documents requested pursuant to a civil investigative demand. 99
Courts have expressed various views as to the time at which an agency's
activity first qualifies as a "proceeding" under section 1505: when the agency
is notified of potential violations;10 0 when pre-investigation begins; 0 1 when an
informal inquiry begins; 102 or when a formal order is issued directing investigation to begin. 0 3 In general, however, the "proceeding" of section 1505 has
been construed more broadly than the "proceeding" of section 1503. As one
court explained:
[T]he growth and expansion of agency activities have resulted in a meaning
being given to "proceeding" which is much more inclusive and which no
longer limits itself to formal activities in a court of law. Rather, the investigation or search for the true facts . . . is not ruled 104
as a nonproceeding simply
and trial.

because it is preliminary to indictment

Consistent with this enlarged definition of "proceeding," the courts have
read section 1505 to embrace a wide variety of conduct, including the destruction or concealment of documents. Thus, the Second Circuit has stated: "[Section] 1505 deals with the deliberate frustrations through the use of corrupt or
false means of an agency's attempt to gather relevant evidence. The blatantly
evasive witness achieves this effect as surely by erecting a screen of feigned
forgetfulness as one who burns files."' 0 5
Although the vast majority of convictions under section 1505 involve conduct directed against witnesses, courts often assume and parties concede that
document destruction falls within the sphere of prohibited activity. 10 6 For example, courts have invoked section 1505 to punish the destruction of
documents relevant to congressional proceedings. In United States v. Presser,' 07 a
defendant was convicted of destroying records which he knew a Senate Select
Committee would want because they "bore a reasonable relation to the subject
08
matter of the [Committee's] inquiry.")
98 15 U.S.C. 5 1311-1314 (1976).
99 See Baker, supra note 3, at 38; D. Smaltz, supra note 72, at 123.
100 Rice v. United States, 356 F.2d 709, 714 (8th Cir. 1966) (filing of charges with NLRB adequate to
trigger 5 1505 despite absence of formal complaint).
101 United States v. Browning, Inc., 572 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1978). (Bureau of Customs' initial evaluation proceeding designated proceeding within 5 1505 although only a prelude to criminal investigation), cert.

denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978).
102 See, e.g., United States v. Fruchtman, 421 F.2d 1019, 1021 (6th Cir. 1970). (FTC preliminary staff
investigation into corporate pricing practices held a proceeding), cerl. denied, 400 U.S. 849 (1970).
103 United States v. Batten, 226 F. Supp. 492 (D.D.C. 1964), aff'd, (D.C. Cir.) (unpublished order),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 912 (1965).
104 United States v. Browning, 572 F.2d 720, 724 (10th Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978).
105 United States v. Alo, 439 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1971).
106 Id.
107 187 F. Supp. 64 (N.D. Ohio 1960), aff'd, 292 F.2d 171 (6th Cir. 1961), aff'd by an equally divided court,
371 U.S. 71 (1962).
108 Id. Cf United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728, 734 (9th Cir. 1972) (government must prove records
subpoenaed and subsequently destroyed were material to grand jury proceeding to support § 1503 conviction).

[Vol. 56:5]

DOCUMENT RETENTION AND DESTRUCTION

As under section 1503, document destruction is illegal under section 1505
provided there is a nexus between the conduct and the pending proceedings.
Once an agency or congressional inquiry has commenced, potentially affected
parties should refrain from destroying documents known or suspected to be
relevant, whether or not a formal request has been issued. Unfortunately, cases
decided under section 1505 do not provide the unambiguous guidelines provided by section 1503 cases. In trying to avoid culpability under section 1503, the
boundaries are clear-once a complaint has been filed or a grand jury subpoena has been issued, destruction of pertinent documents constitutes an
obstruction ofjustice. However, the uncertain scope of section 1505 prevents a
confident determination of the time at which destruction becomes culpable.
Thus, anyone who contemplates destroying documents before a proceeding
begins must consider the possibility that a court may, by interpreting section
1505 flexibly, extend the section's coverage so as to render illegal obstructive
conduct occurring while the proceeding is imminent or even reasonably
foreseeable.
Although the cases suggest that an agency or the Congress must take
focused action regarding a particular matter before a "proceeding" is deemed
pending under section 1505, they provide little guidance as to how complete a
party's knowledge that the proceeding is pending must be before destruction of
documents violates the statute. A plausible, but perhaps unduly narrow,
reading would permit a party to destroy records until he either personally
receives notice of the proceeding or acquires knowledge of it through public
channels. Even if he is aware of the proceeding, a party who neither knows nor
suspects that documents are relevant may avoid liability if he destroys them in
good faith, since the requisite criminal intent would be absent. However, a
court might impute knowledge to the party (and consequently criminal intent)
if it finds that the party should have known of the documents' relevance and of
the proceeding's existence at the time he destroyed the documents.
As under section 1503, issuance of a formal demand for documents or for
a witness's testimony is not a prerequisite to maintaining a section 1505 action.
The section has been construed to be violated by falsification of records in anticipation of an agency or congressional subpoena, 10 9 and by intimidation of
persons who the defendant knows are likely or actual witnesses. 110 Thus, if a
party engages in obstructive conduct after being apprised of agency or congressional action, however informal or preliminary, he will likely be subject to
sanction under section 1505.
A stricter reading of section 1505 would prevent any party who suspects
that an agency or congressional investigation is under way, or who concludes
from signals that such a proceeding is reasonably foreseeable, from destroying
109 United States v. Tallant, 407 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (dictum), aff'd, 547 F.2d 1291 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 889 (1977). Once the agency subpoena has issued, falsification or destruction of
documents falls squarely within the statute. See United States .v. Vixie, 532 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1976).
110 Stein v. United States, 337 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1964) (statute prohibits corruptly influencing any person known to be an actual or probable witness to provide false information), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 907
(1965); accord, United States v. Batten, 226 F. Supp. 492 (D.D.C. 1964), aft'd, (D.C. Cir.) (unpublished
order), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 912 (1965). But see Berra v. United States, 221 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1955) (unless
defendant knows the party interfered with was an actual or likely witness, evidence to convict under S 1505
may be insufficient), aff'd, 351 U.S. 131 (1956).
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potentially relevant documents. Since anyone may become the target of agency
or congressional proceedings, such a strict reading would require parties to
preserve all marginally significant documents. This would defeat the valid objectives of well-planned document management programs.
No court has construed the statute to prohibit the destruction of
documents relevant to an investigation in no more than a purely speculative
stage of the judicial, administrative or legislative process. Thus, absent concrete proceedings, there remains a great deal of flexibility to destroy
documents. However, discretion is not unlimited, particularly where a signal,
such as a letter, has been received indicating that an investigation is about to
commence. Where the possibility of an inquiry exists, even though it may appear extremely remote, prudence dictates great caution before destroying relevant documents.
3. Section 1510
In 1967 Congress added a third obstruction of justice statute, section
1510, thereby compounding the difficulty of determining when documents may
properly be disposed."' In order to close the loopholes in sections 1503 and
1505, section 1510 provides sanctions for obstructive conduct occurring priorto
2
the commencement of judicial, administrative or legislative proceedings.1
This expansive statute punishes interference with the transmission of information concerning criminal activity to federal investigators. No court has decided
whether section 1510 covers the destruction of documents prior to a proceeding
where the destruction is intended to obstruct the flow of information.
The Fifth Circuit has set forth three requirements for a section 1510 violation:
(1) an act by the defendant of willfully endeavoring, by means of intimidation
and threats of force, to prevent the communication of information relating to a
violation of the federal criminal laws; (2) the action must have been taken to
prevent the communication from being made to an individual authorized to
conduct or engage in investigations of such violations; and (3) the knowledge
by the defendant that the recipient or intended
recipient of the information
113
was a criminal investigator, as defined.
111 D. Smaltz, supra note 72, at 126.
112 For a discussion of the legislative history of § 1510, see United States v. Koehler, 544 F.2d 1326, 1328
n.3 (5th Cir. 1977):
House Report No. 658, dated September 21, 1967 [reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD.
NEws 1760] explains the purpose of section 1510:
Sections 1503 and 1505 ... prohibit attempts to influence, intimidate, impede, or injure
a witness or juror in a judicial proceeding, a proceeding before a Federal agency, or an inquiry or investigation by either House of the Congress or a congressional committee.
However, attempts to obstruct a criminal investigation or inquiry before a proceeding has
been initiated are not within the proscription of those sections. The proposed legislation
would remedy that deficiency by providing penalties for attempting to obstruct the communication to a Federal penal law, thus extending to informants and potential witnesses the
protections now afforded witnesses and jurors in judicial, administrative, and congressional
proceedings.
Case law relies on this legislative history. See, e.g., United States v. San Martin, 515 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.
1975); United States v. Williams, 470 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973); United States
v. Cameron, 460 F.2d 1394 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Mitchell, 372 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D.N.Y.) appeal
dismissed sub nom. Stand v. Gagliardi, 485 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1973).
113 United States v. San Martin, 515 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1975).
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Three parties are essential to a section 1510 offense: an investigator; a witness,
source or informant; and a party who willfully endeavors to obstruct the communication of information. 1 14 Although the courts generally agree upon the
essential requirements of a section 1510 violation,
the knowledge requirement
1 15
has received conflicting interpretations.
The elements of section 1510 generally coincide with the requirements of
the other obstruction statutes,11 6 with one major exception: the point in time at
which section 1510 is invoked. Section 1510 applies whenever a government investigator is conducting a search for information about illegal activities; it does
not require a judicial, administrative or congressional proceeding.1 1 7 After a
formal investigation or proceeding has begun, obstructive conduct evidently
falls beyond the scope of section 1510, and must be prosecuted under section
1503 or section 1505. One court of appeals, however, has held that conviction
under section 1510 for conduct occurring subsequent to the original indictment
is not foreclosed simply because a judicial trial has commenced. 1 ,
Because so few courts have construed section 1510, its limits are unclear.
By analogous reasoning, however, a court is likely to find that deliberate
destruction of documents violates section .1510 if it occurs before proceedings
have begun and is intended to prevent the'communication of incriminating information to government investigators. Thus, where agency or congressional
action remains speculative, a court which dismisses an indictment under section 1505 might nevertheless find an offense under section 1510.
Although an agency inquiry does not qualify as a judicial proceeding
under section 1503,11 9 it may ripen into such a proceeding if agency officials apply for subpoenas, regardless of any direct grand jury involvement.1 20 In such a
case, destruction of documents could be prosecuted under section 1503 as well
as under 1505.
From the perspective of the party destroying documents, the timing of his
114 United States v. Cameron, 460 F.2d 1394 (5th Cir. 1972). The circuits disagree on the intended
beneficiaries of the statutory protections. See, e.g., United States v. Cuesta, 597 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1979)
(designed to protect individuals, whether witness or informants, assisting federal investigation), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 964 (1979); cf. United States v. Fraley, 538 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1976) (primary subject of protection
is transmission of words of prospective informant or witness, not investigator's safety).
115 See, e.g., United States v. San Martin, 515 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1975) (government must prove defendant knew or reasonably believed recipient of threat had information she had furnished or would furnish investigators and that defendant threatened to prevent communication); United States v. Lippman, 492 F.2d
314, 317 (6th Cir. 1974) (defendant must have actual knowledge that intended recipient of information was
federal criminal investigator), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975). But see United States v. Kozak, 438 F.2d
1062 (3d Cir. 1971) (requisite endeavor exists where defendant reasonably believed the informant would
transmit the information, even absent proof defendant actually knew the informant had or would do so),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 996 (1971).
116 See United States v. Carleo, 576 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1978) (government must prove specific intent to
obstruct justice), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 850 (1978); United States v. St. Clair, 552 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1977) (no
requirement that same person seeking to obstruct also make misrepresentations to potential witness, since
endeavor suffices) (citing legislative history of "misrepresentation" in H.R. REP. No. 658, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., reprinted in [1967] U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 1760, 1762), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909 (1977).
Cf.United States v. Williams, 470 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1973) (proof of proscribed conduct without scienter to
obstruct passage of information will not sustain S 1510 conviction), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973). See also
United States v. Carzoli, 447 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1971) (immaterial whether victim actually feels threatened,
since success is not required), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1015 (1972).
117 United States v. Lippman, 492 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975).
118 United States v. Koehler, 544 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977).
119 United States v. Simmons, 591 F.2d 206 (3d Cir. 1979); accord, United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728
(9th Cir. 1972) (investigating agencies not judicial arms of the government).
120 United States v. Simmons, 591 F.2d 206.

THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[October 1980]

conduct is critical since at some point it ceases to be routine business behavior
and raises the spectre of criminal liability. However, the timing of obstructive
conduct is only one element, albeit a potentially dispositive one, of the obstruction offense.
The remaining elements of the three offenses should also be considered
before disposing of documents, and warrant examination.
4. Elements of the Offense Under Sections 1503, 1505 and 1510.
Although the statutes do not enumerate all the elements of an obstruction
of justice offense, the case law sets forth the requirements for a section 1503
violation. 1 21 These requirements have not yet been applied explicitly to
destruction of documents cases brought under section 1505 or section 1510, but
they undoubtedly apply to obstructive acts occurring during pending or ongoing criminal investigations or judicial, administrative or congressional proceedings. In 1978, the Third Circuit summarized section 1503's requirements
as follows:
A person who knows that a Federal Grand Jury is investigating certain
possible violations of federal law, and who has reason to believe that a certain
incriminating document is likely to come to the Grand Jury's attention, and
who intentionally causes the destruction of that document in order to prevent
it from falling into the hands of the Grand Jury, may . .. properly be convicted of obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503.122

The court found criminal culpability unaffected by the fact that the defendant induced another to destroy the incriminating letter rather than destroying
it himself.' 23 This refusal to distinguish between the party who performs the
destructive act and the party who advises that the act be performed finds support in statutes, cases and ethical writings. 124 A lawyer consequently risks pros121 United States v. Haas, 583 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1978) (although statute fails to require
"knowledge" and "intent," both are essential elements), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979). Because the
statutes are silent, courts have held that indictments in the words of the statutes will state a claim, despite
failure to allege elements necessary to prove the offense. See, e.g., United States v. Tallant, 407 F. Supp. 878
(N.D. Ga. 1975) (unnecessary to allege intent), aff'd 547 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 889
(1977); United States v. Zolli, 51 F.R.D. 522, 526 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (unnecessary to allege defendant's
knowledge that person he endeavored to influence was witness). Cf. United States v. Haas, 583 F.2d 216
(5th Cir. 1978) (indictment need not contain specific words, but must recite facts and use language showing
knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979); Knight v. United States, 310 F.2d 305 (5th Cir.
1962) (indictment need not allege defendant's success). Accord, United States v. Mitchell, 372 F. Supp.
1239, 1253 (S.D.N.Y.) (indictment need not allege means by which offense accomplished, but must contain
elements sufficient to apprise defendant of charges), appeal dismissed sub noa. Stans v. Gagliardi, 485 F.2d
1290 (2d Cir. 1973).
122 United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 197, 202 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem., 571 F.2d 572 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 945 (1978).
123 Id.
124 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1976) and parallel state penal codes: "Whoever willfully causes an act to
be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense.., is punishable as a principal."
See also Note, Legal Ethics and the Destruction of Evidence, 88 YALE L.J. 1665 (1979); Beckstrom, supra note 26.
For a discussion of the ethical implications, see Shipman, ProfessionalResponsibilitiesof the CorporationsLawyer,
in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A GUIDE FOR ATTORNEYS, 271-309 (A.B.A. Press 1978). The author states
that "[ilf counsel believes that a plan, though arguably legal, is more likely than not illegal (as opposed to
more likely than not legal), I seriously doubt that he has established a good faith shield to protect himself
from aider and abettor liability in civil actions and to keep himself within his malpractice policy or its indemnification provision." Id. at 297. In a criminal setting, the burden of proof is on the government, once it has
proven that a third person has endeavored to obstruct justice, to connect the defendant with the principal as
aider and abettor. United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20, 40 (6th Cir. 1965), aff'd, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
Where an attorney's conduct would fall short of a criminal violation, ethical sanctions might be imposed.
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ecution as a possible conspirator or aider and abettor if he recommends an act
of destruction which is later found punishable. However, in no reported case
has a lawyer been convicted for advising destruction of evidence unless his actions were so egregious as to leave no doubt of personal guilt. A lawyer may
also run afoul of ethical obligations by allowing his client to commit an illegal
act. As discussed in section VI of this article, the A.B.A. Code of Professional
Responsibility has not proven an effective tool for guiding ethical conduct in
this area.
Regardless of who destroys the documents, that person may not be convicted under any of the obstruction ofjustice statutes unless he is found to have
possessed specific criminal intent. 125 This element of the offense has received
extensive judicial analysis. The courts have divided on whether the defendant
must specifically intend to obstruct justice, 126 or merely perform an act which
1 27
he reasonably should know tends to impede the administration of justice.
The most recent judicial pronouncement adopts the latter view, declaring the
defendant's intent irrelevant if the natural result of his effort interferes with
judicial process.1 28 In United States v. Neiswender, the Fourth Circuit stated that
to satisfy the intent requirement "the defendant need only have knowledge or
notice that success in his fraud would have likely resulted in an obstruction of
justice. Notice is provided by the reasonable foreseeability of the natural and
probable consequences of one's acts." 129 The court noted that its "foreseeability" standard more effectively deters obstructive conduct. 130
The implications of the Neiswender approach are troublesome. Eliminating
any inquiry into the "subtleties of specific intent" drastically, and perhaps impermissibly, alters the nature of the offense. If the scienter requirement is removed, a person would be subject to criminal penalties for disposing of
documents if (1) the person intended to commit the act of destruction, and (2)
he should reasonably have foreseen that the conduct would thwart the process
125 The circuits generally agree that a corrupt purpose is an element of specific intent, but there is considerable variation as to whether the corrupt motive must be exclusive, predominant or may be inferred
from the endeavor to obstruct justice. See, e.g., United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233, 239, 242 (10th Cir.
1979) (force or threats need not be used to establish corrupt endeavor, nor must there be evil purpose or
fiendish motive); United States v. Baker, 611 F.2d 961, 968 n.3 (4th Cir. 1979) (attorney advising prosecuting witness against testifying may still violate § 1503 even where motive is to protect client and
safeguard interests of witnesses); United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1336 n.9 (5th Cir. 1978) (section
1503 covers the conduct only if offending action was prompted, at least in part, by "corrupt" motive), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 834 (1978); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 114 n.226 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (specific
intent requires knowingly committing an act with a corrupt purpose), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977);
United States v. Fayer, 523 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1975) (whether defendant endeavored to act corruptly is
mixed question of law and fact and trial judge probably misconstrued 5 1503 to require predominant or exclusive corrupt motive; but to remand for findings of motive alone would violate double jeopardy clause);
United States v. Cohen, 202 F. Supp. 587 (D. Conn. 1962) ("corruptly" includes any endeavor to influence
a witness or to obstruct justice). The endeavor element renders 5 1503 very similar to a criminal solicitation
statute which does not require proof to support a charge of attempt. United States v. Fasolino, 586 F.2d 939
(2d Cir. 1978). Accord, United States v. Lazzerini, 611 F.2d 940 (1st Cir. 1979).
126 See, e.g., Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197 (1893); Knight v. United States, 310 F.2d 305 (5th
Cir. 1962); Ethridge v. United States, 258 F.2d 234, 235 (9th Cir. 1958).
127 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 585 F.2d 119, 128 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Harris, 558
F.2d 366, 369 (7th Cir. 1977).
128 United States v. Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269, 1274 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 963 (1979).
129 Id. at 1273. The Court of Appeals also approved the jury instruction that it is reasonable to infer a
person intends the natural and probable consequences of acts knowingly done or undertaken. Accord, United
States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1979).
130 See note 128 supra. See also United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1979) (government must
charge and prove that consequences of false testimony impeded justice), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 48 (1980).
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ofjustice. Ultimate liability would depend on whether a proceeding ensued and
the relevancy of the document to the proceeding. Although no court has imposed criminal sanctions absent proof of specific intent, the Supreme Court declined the opportunity to clarify the intent requirement by denying certiorari in
Neiswender.
1 31
Success is not at present a required element of an obstruction offense.
1 32
The corrupt endeavor alone, regardless of it results, constitutes the offense.
The rationale for this position appears to be that even a person who fails in his
attempt to obstruct the process of justice has sufficiently compromised the integrity of the process to warrant criminal sanction. This position is questionable, since a person whose obstructive efforts are thwarted sufficiently early
fails to interfere with the "due administration of justice." Yet, even in cases
where the obstructive efforts have been stymied, the courts have punished the
attempt either as a substantive offense or as a conspiracy to defraud the United
States. 133
Occasionally, trial courts instruct juries to consider all circumstantial
evidence in determining specific intent.1 34 A person whose intentions are ambiguous is more likely to be convicted under such an instruction, particularly if
he destroyed documents selectively rather than pursuant to a routine program.
Circumstances which might increase the likelihood that a jury will find
criminal intent include hiring outside counsel to conduct an internal investigation, irregularly searching files, selectively destroying confusing or misleading
documents, and destroying documents after receipt of cues from an agency or
congressional committee. Although none of these actions by itself suffices to
establish an intent to obstruct justice, in the aggregate they may create the impression that such intent exists. 135
B. Federal Law: Collateral Charges
Destruction of documents may be prosecuted not only under the general
obstruction of justice statutes but also under statutory provisions criminalizing
conspiracy, 36 contempt of court, 37 false statements, 38 and misprision of
131 See, e.g., United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Baker, 611 F.2d 961
(4th Cir. 1979); United States v. McCarty, 611 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1319 (1980);
United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Jackson, 607 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir.
1979), ceri. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1032 (1980); United States v. Vixie, 532 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Cioffi, 493 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 917 (1974). Since success is not an element, it
is no defense that the endeavor failed. See United States v. Fasolino, 586 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing
United States v. Russell, 255 U.S. 138, 143 (1921); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
LAW § 58 (1972).

132 But see United States v. Solow, 138 F. Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (success may aggravate the offense).
133 See, e.g., United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1979) (defendant still guilty of endeavor to
obstruct justice and conspiracy despite fact that prior to releasing his distorted report, U.S. Attorney
became aware and withheld report from pending grand jury).
134 See, e.g., United States v. White, 557 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1977). See also United States v. Haldeman,
559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (proper to charge jury to consider all circumstances surrounding obstruction
charge in determining specific intent), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977).
135 For a general discussion of suppression of evidence by the prosecution see Comment,Judicial Response
to Governmental Loss or Destructionof Evidence, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 542 (1972). See also American Friends Ser-

vice Committee v. Webster, 485 F. Supp. 222 (D.D.C. 1980).
136 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
137 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976).
138 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).

[Vol. 56:5]

DOCUMENT RETENTION AND DESTRUCTION

felony.139 Prosecution is also possible under the Federal Trade Commission
Act,1 40 which criminalizes mutilation, alteration or other falsification of certain
documentary evidence.
1. Section 371: Conspiracy
Actions brought under the obstruction statutes for destruction of
documents are often accompanied by charges of conspiracy to defraud the
United States.' 4' Under section 371 any conspiracy to defraud or commit an
offense against the United States is rendered illegal. 42 A conspiracy exists only
if there is (1) an agreement, (2) an overt act by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy's objectives, and (3) an intent on the part of the con43
spirators to defraud the United States.1
The Department of Justice has brought conspiracy charges against persons who selectively destroy corporate records after a subpoena has been
issued.14 4 It is especially likely to bring such charges when the obstruction has
been thwarted or an essential element of the substantive offense is missing. Yet
conspiracy charges are difficult to prove, and may unnecessarily complicate the
prosecution's task since conspiracy requires proof of three elements while
obstruction only requires proof that a single person acted deliberately to
obstruct justice.
2. Section 401: Contempt
Courts have held parties in criminal contempt for destruction of
documents amounting to an obstruction of justice. Section 4011 45 allows the
courts to punish anyone who disobeys court orders, including subpoenas and
46
grand jury subpoenas. 1
Many jurisdictions regard section 401 and section 1503 as parallel con139
140
141
142
that:

18 U.S.C.
15 U.S.C.
See Baker,
18 U.S.C.

5 4 (1976).
§ 50 (1976).
supra note 3, at 38.
§ 371 (1976) (Conspiracy To Commit Offense or To Defraud United States) provides

If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to
defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or
more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment
provided for such misdemeanor.
143 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 443 n.20 (1978) (citing W. LAFAvE & A.
SCOTr, JR., supra note 131 § 61, at 464-65 (1972); United' States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1979);
United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), rev'd on othergrounds sub nom. United States v.
Buffalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).
144 United States v. Treadway, Crim. No. 3-77-308 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 1977); United States v.
Turen, Crim. No. 74-172 (D.N.J. May 16, 1974).
145 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976) (Power of Court) provides that:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its
discretion, such contempt of it authority, and none other, as(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.
146 See generally R. Borow and S. Baskin, supra note 1, at 231-33; Baker, supra note 3, at 39.
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tempt statutes since they derive from the same congressional act. The statutes
differ in significant respects, however. The obstruction statute concerns out-ofcourt conduct, and requires an indictment and trial. The contempt statute concerns in-court conduct and conduct in defiance of court orders,14 7 and permits
summary punishments when the government chooses not to prosecute the conduct. 148 Despite these differences, the two offenses often overlap, enabling the
government to proceed under either or both statutes.
Contempt is committed when a court orders documents produced and a
party defies the order by deliberately destroying the requested documents.
Obstruction of justice is committed when a party pursues "affirmative conduct," such as destruction, concealment or removal of documents, regardless
of where that conduct occurs. In one document destruction case, the Third Circuit found convictions for violations of both statutes permissible, if not appropriate. 149
The government may, however, elect to proceed under both statutes for a
single offense. The mere fact that a statutory provision punishes certain conduct does not render that provision the exclusive mode of punishment unless
the provision so requires. 150 The courts have found nothing in the legislative
history of section 401 indicating a congressional intent to prohibit prosecutions
under section 1503 even of conduct clearly punishable as contempt. 1 5 1 On the
contrary, statements of legislative purpose indicate that section 401 was
enacted to curb the contempt power of federal courts.15 2 To prohibit the
government from proceeding concurrently under parallel statutes, such as section 401 and 1503, would thus contravene congressional intent.
The contempt sanction of section 401(3) is available for punishing
deliberate destruction of subpoenaed documents regardless of where the
destructive act occurred. However, absent lawful process, section 401(1) may
be invoked only against misconduct occurring in or near a courthouse. This
147 See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 591 F.2d 206 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d
1331 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 834 (1978); United States v. Harris, 558 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Essex, 407 F.2d 214 (6th Cir.
1969).
148 United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1336 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 834 (1978). See also
Kuhns, The Summary Contempt Power: A Critique and a New Perspective, 88 YALE LJ. 39 (1978).
149 United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 680 (3d Cir. 1975). If the subpoenaed party were also a
witness he might risk immediate confinement under 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1976), which states that:
Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the
United States refuses without just cause shown to comply with an order of the court to testify or
provide other information, including any book, paper, document, record, recording or other
material, the court, upon such refusal, or when such refusal is duly brought to its attention, may
summarily order his confinement at a suitable place until such times as the witness is willing to
give such testimony or provide such information. No period of such confinement shall exceed the
life of(1) the court proceeding, or
(2) the term of the grand jury, including extensions,
before which such refusal to comply with the court order occurred, but in no event shall such confinement exceed eighteen months.
150 Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 49 (1941); Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197 (1893); Ex
parte Savin, 131 U.S. 267 (1889); United States v. Harris, 558 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1977) United States v.
Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 680 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Zouras, 497 F.2d 1115, 1121 n.16 (7th Cir.
1974); United States v. Ruggiero, 472 F.2d 599, 606 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
151 United States v. Harris, 558 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 680
(3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Essex, 407 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1969).
152 United States v. Harris, 558 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing United States v. Essex, 407 F.2d 214
(6th Cir. 1969)).
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geographic limitation severely restricts the contempt power as a penalty for
document destruction, since such conduct is unlikely to be pursued in close
proximity to a court.1 53 However, on rare occasions outside the document
destruction context, the courts have relaxed the physical proximity requirement, and sustained contempt of court convictions for out-of-court conduct
154
even where no court order had been issued.
In another extension of the contempt power, courts have punished those
who either refuse to respond to questions concerning destruction of documents
or who respond falsely.1 55 Had defendants in these cases destroyed the
documents to avoid compliance with an outstanding subpoena, section 401(3)
would have been violated. Even without the subpoena, it is arguable that such
conduct constitutes contempt whether committed in a courtroom, before a congressional committee or during informal communications with a judge.
An unresolved question is whether misleading replies concerning the
underlying prohibited act constitute obstruction of justice as well as contempt
of court. A compelling argument can be made that a company which falsely
states that it has destroyed documents obstructs justice to the same extent as if
it had actually destroyed them, since the documents are equally unavailable in
either case. Until recently the courts uniformly rejected this argument, holding
that the language of the obstruction and contempt statutes did not apply to
merely rendering false statements.1 56 In 1979, however, the Fifth Circuit held
perjury to be included within the omnibus clause of section 1503.157 Thus, the
courts are currently split on whether perjury alone will sustain a conviction for
obstructing justice.
It is unsettled whether a company may be prosecuted under the obstruction statute for completely refusing to answer formal or possibly informal inquiries concerning document destruction. While such silence may qualify as
contemptuous conduct, fifth amendment problems arise in classifying silence
as an affirmative act of interference. Several courts have held section 1503 to be
violated when the defendant went beyond suggesting that a witness invoke the
fifth amendment and engaged in concerted, corrupt efforts to persuade the
witness to remain silent.1 58 Thus, while a person who invokes the fifth amend153 See Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941); accord, Millinocket Theatre, Inc. v. Kurson, 39 F.
Supp. 979 (D. Me. 1941) (district court found it lacked authority to punish for criminal contempt where accused instructed secretary to destroy documents after learning his deposition would be taken, but before formal process issued). For another limitation on the scope of the contempt power, see International Union
(UAW) v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1338-39 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (adverse inference rule is available to court
where enforcement of a contempt order would be both awkward and expensive).
154 United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir.) (defendants convicted under § 401 for
possessing and disclosing unreleased grand jury transcripts despite contempt perpetrated out of court), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971). Presser v. United States, 284 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (union official convicted for contempt for refusal to answer Senate Committee question concerning his destruction of
documents subsequent to receiving Committee's subpoena), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 816 (1961).
155 Presser v. United States, 284 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 816 (1961).
156 "All perjured relevant testimony is at war with justice, since it may produce a judgment not resting
on truth. Therefore, it cannot be denied that it tends to defeat the sole ultimate objective of a trial. It need
not necessarily, however, obstruct or halt the judicial process.".In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1941)
(Black, J.). See also, United States v. Essex, 407 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1969) (false testimony alone will not
amount to contempt of court or obstruction ofjustice). Accord, Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941); Ex
parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378 (1919); United States v. Goldstein, 158 F.2d 916 (7th Cir. 1947); United
States v. Campbell, 350 F. Supp. 213 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
157 United States v. Griffith, 589 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 48 (1980).
158 In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1192 n.8 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 249
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); United States v. Fayer, 523 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1975); United
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ment and refuses to testify concerning destruction of documents is answerable
only for contempt, an attorney who corruptly advises that person not to respond to questions about document destruction risks prosecution under both
the obstruction and the contempt statutes.
3. Section 1001: False Statements
The general false-statements statute 159 concerns prosecution for false
statements to the government. Although this statute has not been applied to
destruction of documents, one author suggests it could be so used, particularly
if a party fails to answer an antitrust civil investigative demand correctly in ex1 60
plaining how his documents have been destroyed.
4. Section 4: Misprision of Felony
The government has brought actions for conduct that obstructs justice
under section 4,161 the misprision of felony statute. 162 This provision
criminalizes concealment of a felony, and does not require that an investigation
or proceeding be pending. To obtain a conviction under section 4 the government must prove that: (1) the principal has committed the felony alleged; (2)
the accused had full knowledge of the fact of the crime; (3) the accused failed to
disclose the crime to authorities; and (4) the accused affirmatively concealed
the crime by suppressing evidence, intimidating witnesses or committing perjury. 163 The Fifth Circuit has held that no misprision of felony occurs when the
defendant failed to report a felony but did not engage in a positive act of concealment.164 Some appellate courts imply that the party's intent determines
whether concealment occurred. 165 In the destruction of documents context, the
existence of a routine destruction program would seem to indicate an intent to
eliminate obsolete records rather than an intent to conceal a felony. The
misprision of felony statute is rarely enforced, and repeated proposals have
66
been made to repeal it.
States v. Cioffi, 493 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 917 (1974); Cole v. United States, 329 F.2d
437 (9th Cir.), cert. dnied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964). See also United States v. Schwartzbaum, 527 F.2d 249 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 942 (1976); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v. Marionneaux, 514 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1975).
159 18 U.S.C. 5 1001 (1976) (Statements or Entries Generally) provides that:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a
material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes
or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or
fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
160 Baker, supra note 3, at 39.
161 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1976) (Misprision of Felony) provides that:
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the
United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or
other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined not more than
$500 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
162 See Baker, supra note 3, at 39; B. Lipson, supra note 26.
163 United States v. Hodges, 566 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1977); Sullivan v. United States, 411 F.2d 556 (10th
Cir. 1969); Neal v. United States, 102 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 679 (1941).
164 United States v. Johnson, 546 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1977).
165 See, e.g., United States v. King, 402 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1968).
166 Both the ALI Model Penal Code and the United States National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws FINAL REPORT proposed replacing the misprision offense with hindering law enforcement
and aiding consummation of crime provisions. MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962);
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWs § 1303-1304 (1971).
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C. State Law
Many of the states which have enacted legislation dealing with destruction
of documents or tampering with physical evidence impose requirements more
stringent than those found in the federal obstruction statutes.1 67 Other states'
68
provisions simply parallel the federal laws.1
The Model Penal Code provision, enacted in several states with slight
variations, makes document destruction a misdemeanor where a person
"believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or is about to
be instituted ... alters, destroys, conceals or removes any records, document
or thing with purpose to impair its verity or availability in such proceeding or
investigation.' ' 1 69 New York's statutory language is similar, except that the
proscribed conduct is a felony.1 70 Other states criminalize only the destruction
of physical evidence admissible in another's trial for a public offense, 171 leaving
unaffected destruction of documents relevant to proceedings and investigations
by agencies, grand juries or legislative committees. 172 Several states go beyond
the Model Code by emphasizing a person's intent rather than the timing or
nature of the proceeding. These states criminalize document destruction if the
person who destroys the documents does so with the intent to hinder the administration of law, 1 73 to injure or defraud, 174 to prevent production, 175 or to

176
impair the verity, legibility, or availability of the documents.
The states classify document destruction from a misdemeanor (including
aggravated and gross) 177 to various grades of felony. 178 Some, including Arkansas and Missouri, punish as a felony destruction which obstructs the prosecution or defense of a felony, while punishing as a misdemeanor other tampering
with physical evidence.1 79 Perhaps the broadest statute, enacted in Nevada,
states that '"every person who, with the intent to hinder the administration of

the law or to prevent the production thereof at any time, . . . shall willfully

destroy... any book, paper... or thing"'180 is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
167 For a discussion of the state statutes see Note, supra note 118, at 1671-72.
168 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-32-3 (Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3816 (1974).
169 MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.7 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Cf. FLA. STAT. S 918.13(A) (1973)
(third-degree felony for person who knows proceeding is pending or about to be and destroys).
170 N.Y. PENAL LAW 5 215.40(2) (McKinney 1975). See People v. Nicholas, 70 A.D.2d 804, 417
N.Y.S.2d 495 (1979) (tampering with evidence charge valid where defendant allegedly moved dead body
despite absence of proceeding pending with reference to the body), rev'g 93 Misc. 2d 1037, 403 N.Y.S.2d
683 (1978). Cf CAL. PENAL CODE § 135 (West 1976) (misdemeanor for person who, knowing document is
about to be produced in evidence, destroys to prevent availability). See also People v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 53 Cal. App. 3d 40, 125 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1975) (criminal offense to destroy or conceal
evidence).
171

See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. S 719.3(1) (West 1979).

172

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 918.13(1)(A) (1973).

173

NEv. REv. STAT. § 199.220 (1979).

174 MINN. STAT. ANN. S 609.63(1)(7) (West 1964) (forgery provision (including document destruction)
imposes either prison sentence of no greater than three years or fine or both).
175 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-44-3-4(b)(1) (Burns 1979); ALAsKA STAT. § 11.56.610(A)(1) (Supp. 1978) (effectiveJan. 1, 1980).
176

Mo. ANN. STAT. § 575.100 (West 1979); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2611 (Bobbs-Merrill 1977).

177 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-44-3-4(b)(1) (1980 Supp.) (Class A misdemeanor); IowA CODE ANN. S
719.3(1) (West 1979) (aggravated misdemeanor); NEv. REv. STAT. § 199.220 (1979) (gross misdemeanor).
178 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 918.13(1)(1) (West 1973) (third-degree felony); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 575.100 (Vernon 1979) (Class D felony); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.40(2) (McKinney 1975) (Class E felony); ALAsKA STAT.
§ 11.56.610 (A)(1) (1979) (Class C felony).
179

Mo. ANN. STAT. § 575.100 (Vernon 1979) (Class D felony, Class A misdemeanor); ARK. STAT. ANN.

5 41-2611 (1977) (Class D felony, Class B misdemeanor).
180

NEv. REv. STAT. 5 199.220 (1979) (emphasis added).
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D. Provisions of the ProposedFederal Criminal Codes
Applicable to the Destruction of Documents
Because of criticism of sections 1503, 1505 and 1510,181 Senate and House
of Representatives bills proposing reformation of the federal criminal code include provisions which specifically define obstruction of justice and hindrance
of law enforcement offenses. These provisions are applicable to the wrongful
destruction of documents, and are analyzed below.
1. Status of Senate and House Bills Proposing Code Reformation
In 1966, Congress established the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws (National Commission). After conducting a three and
one-half year study of potential federal criminal code reforms, the National
1 82
Commission submitted a final report to Congress.
During the next nine years, various versions of a new federal criminal
code were introduced in the Senate and House. The Subcommittee on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the full
Committee held extensive hearings on various versions of the code. 183 The
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary Committee held a
8 4
series of informal briefing sessions followed by formal hearings.'
Despite the time and resources devoted to preparing and considering the
various proposals, the bills introduced in the 93d and 94th Congresses failed to
obtain support sufficient for passage in either House.18 5
When the 95th Congress convened, several members of the Senate and
HouseJudiciary Committees and officials of the Department ofJustice reached
an agreement to develop a commonly acceptable version of a new criminal
code. The agreement provided that particular code reform proposals which
might result in-protracted disputes would be put aside until the overall bill was
passed. The troublesome reform proposals would be introduced separately at a
later date. The result of this agreement was introduction of S. 1437 in the
Senate and H.R. 6869 in the House. In January 1978, the Senate passed S.
1437 by a vote of 72 to 15. The 95th Congress ended without passage of a code
bill in the House.
In the 96th Congress, a criminal code bill substantially similar to S. 1437,
modified to negate some of the objections leveled against S. 1437, was introduced into the Senate as S. 1722. In December 1979, the Senate Judiciary
Committee, by a 13-1 vote, ordered favorably reported a modified version of S.
181 See WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS (1970)
[hereinafter cited as WORKING PAPERS].
182 FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS (1971)
[hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
183 Since February, 1971 the Senate has held 47 days of hearings on code reformation, producing a total
of some 11,000 pages; over 200 witnesses have testified and six different bills have been considered.
184 In the 95th and 96th Congresses, the House Judiciary Subcommittee has held 37 days of hearings
and 145 drafting sessions, resulting in 6,000 pages of testimony and debate. Over 135 witnesses have
testified and six different bills have been considered.
185 The principal bill introduced in the 94th Congress, S. 1, was subject to widespread attack from the
business community and interest groups concerned with invasions of civil liberties. Massachusetts Senator
Edward Kennedy, one of the sponsors of S. 1722 (96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1979), the current Senate bill, was a
leader in the fight to defeat S. I.
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1722. On January 17, 1980, S. 1722 was reported to the full Senate. Floor
debate on this bill is anticipated during the fall of 1980. Because of the overwhelming support for S. 1437, S. 1722 is expected to be approved by the
Senate.
The House version of a new criminal code was introduced as H.R. 6233.
After extensive markup sessions, the bill was reported out of the House
Judiciary Subcommittee by an 8-1 vote in March 1980 as H.R. 6915. Four
months later, the House Judiciary Committee, by a 20-11 vote, ordered
favorably reported a modified version of H.R. 6915. On September 25, 1980,
H.R. 6915 was reported to the full House. Floor debate on the bill is expected
in the fall of 1980.
S. 1722 and H.R. 6915 contain equivalent provisions applicable to
destruction of, or tampering with, physical evidence. Both bills create independent offenses for coercing and bribing third persons to violate these principal
provisions. Both bills include "catch-all" obstruction of justice provisions
which could, but probably will not, be applied to the destruction of documents.
The provisions in the two bills applicable to document destruction differ in
several respects. The House bill defines offenses more restrictively than the
Senate bill, and requires a somewhat higher standard of culpability for tampering with physical evidence. In addition, the House bill more narrowly circumscribes the commonly employed preclusions of defenses based on nonadmissibility of evidence and nonexistence of a pending or likely proceeding.
Finally, the number of circumstances which must be demonstrated for a conviction under some of the House provisions exceeds those required by parallel
Senate provisions. These differences warrant independent analysis of each bill.
2. Provisions Applicable to Document Destruction in S. 1722
a. Section 1325: Tampering with Physical Evidence
Section 1325186 is the principal provision in S. 1722 directed at the
destruction of physical evidence. As introduced, section 1325 was identical to
its predecessor in the bill passed by the Senate in the 95th Congress. The provision made altering, destroying, mutilating, concealing, or removing a document with the intent to impair its integrity or its availability for use in an of-

186 Section 1325 (Tampering with Physical Evidence) as contained in S. 1722 (96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1979) and reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee reads as follows:
(a) Offense. A person is guilty of an offense if, knowing an official proceeding is pending or
likely to be instituted, he alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, or removes a record, document, or
other object, with intent to impair its integrity or its availability for use in an official proceeding.
(b) Proof. In a prosecution under this section, evidence that the record, document, or other
object was destroyed pursuant to a destruction program gives rise to a presumption that the
destruction was not with intent to impair its integrity or its availability for use in an official proceeding.
(c) Defense Precluded. It is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that the record,
document, or other object would have been legally privileged or would have been inadmissible in
evidence.
(d) Grading. An offense described in this section is a Class E felony.
(e) Jurisdiction. There is federal jurisdiction over an offense described in this section if the
official proceeding is or would be a federal official proceeding.

THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[October 1980]

ficial proceeding a Class E felony. 187 The provision contained only one express
actus reus element-impairment of physical evidence-and only one mens rea
element-the intent to impair the integrity or availability of the physical
evidence for use in any official proceeding. The provision explicitly precluded
two conceivable affirmative defenses: that an official proceeding was not pending or about to be instituted, and that the documents were legally privileged or
otherwise inadmissible in evidence. Finally, the provision limited federal
jurisdiction to cases when the official proceeding involved "is or would be a
federal official proceeding."' 88
In response to criticisms of the original section, several important changes
were made to section 1325 during Committee markup. Representatives of the
business and legal communities testified that the original section provided insufficient protection for organizations and individuals conducting regular
document destruction programs. The Business Roundtable argued that,
because of the massive volume of "normal" document destruction in the
business world, destruction of documents is an inherently ambiguous
activity. 8 9 The American Bar Association argued that an actor's purpose in
destroying documents should be illegitimate only if he reasonably believed that
an official proceeding is pending or about to be instituted. 90 These groups
urged that section 1325 be modified to require such belief as an element of a
violation. 191 This suggested revision mirrored the National Commission's proposal which was designed to reduce the possibility of "dangerously unfair
' 92
speculation concerning defendant's purpose in destruction cases.'
Persuaded by these criticisms, the Judiciary Committee amended section
1325 to require as a second mens rea element that the defendant know an official
proceeding is either pending or likely to be instituted. The Committee amended the section in two other respects to achieve consistency with this new element. First, it removed the provision precluding the defense that an official
proceeding was not pending or about to be instituted. Since under the amendment the defendant's knowledge of the existence of an official proceeding is an
essential element, the fact that such a proceeding is not pending or likely is a
legitimate defense. Second, the Committee amended the section to provide that
where evidence is destroyed pursuant to a destruction program, a presumption
exists that the actor did not have the requisite intent to impair the integrity or
availability of the evidence. This presumption forces the government to prove
187 Section 2301(b)(5) provides that conviction for a Class E felony may result in imprisonment for a
period not to exceed two years. Section 2101(b)(1) authorizes a term of probation for felony convictions of
not less than one nor more than five years. Section 2103(b) sets out the various discretionary conditions that
could be imposed pursuant to a sentence of probation, including payment of a fine according to the provisions of chapter 22. Section 2201(b) authorizes a fine not to exceed $1,000,000 for an organization convicted
of a felony and not more than $250,000 for an individual. Section 2001(c) provides that an organization
found guilty of an offense shall be sentenced to a term of probation as authorized by chapter 21 and/or a fine
as authorized by chapter 22. Chapters 20 through 23 should be consulted for an analysis of the sentencing
process in the proposed code.
188 S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 1325(e) (1979).
189 See Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on S. 1722 and S. 1723 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 10,078 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Hearings] (Statement of Irving S.
Shapiro on behalf of the Business Roundtable).
190 See id. at 9978 (testimony of George Freeman on behalf of the A.B.A. Corporation, Banking and
Business Law section); see also Note, Report on ProposedFederal Criminal Code, 34 Bus. Law. 725, 790 (1979).
191 See 1979 Hearings, supra note 189.
192 I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 181, at 575.
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that an illegitimate purpose underlies what is otherwise an inherently ambiguous activity.193 The amendment was in response to testimony that document destruction is an integral component of "normal" business activity and
that safeguards are required to ensure that innocent impairment of physical
194
evidence is not criminalized.
As reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, section 1325 contains
only one actus reus element, the tampering with physical evidence. However,
three interrelated mens rea elements must accompany the unlawful conduct.
The mens rea components are designed to restrict prosecutions to occasions
where the destruction of documents was intended to thwart an official pro19
ceeding. 5
The first mens rea which must accompany tampering with physical
evidence is specific intent' 96 to impair the integrity or availability of the evidence
for use in a judicial proceeding; the second is knowledge'97 that an official proceeding is pending or likely to be instituted. Proof of these two mental states
would ordinarily not occur by independent means. For example, establishing
knowledge of a pending or likely proceeding would go a long way toward proving the requisite intent to disrupt an official proceeding.
The third mens rea element is implied in section 1325. Although the section
does not specifically prescribe a culpability standard with respect to physically
tampering with evidence,' 98 section 303(b) states that if an element of an offense is described without requiring.a specific state of mind, the state of mind
with respect to that conduct must be "knowing." Thus, the mens rea applicable
to tampering with evidence requires that the offender be aware he was destroying or tampering with a particular document. Proof of this "knowing" state of
mind is dependent on proof of the other mens rea elements. For example, proof
that an actor knew of an ongoing official proceeding would suggest that the actor was "aware" he was destroying or tampering with a particular document
when he acted.
The greatest uncertainty regarding the elements of a section 1325 offense
concerns whether the presence of a pending or likely official proceeding is required. Section 1325(a) literally requires only knowledge of a pending or likely
proceeding. Since section 302 defines knowledge as awareness or belief that a
circumstance exists, the precise wording of section 1325 evidently requires only
that the actor believe a proceeding is pending or likely in order to commit an offense, regardless of whether his belief is justified.
However, the Judiciary Committee has interpreted section 1325 as requiring that a proceeding in fact be pending or likely. The Senate Report on S.
1722 states that "[i]t is the intent to impair the ultimate availability for use of
193 Report of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaryto Accompany S. 1722, S. REP. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
336 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report on S. 1772].
194 See 1979 Hearings, supra note 189, at 9979 (testimony of George Freeman).
195 See I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 181, at 575-76.
196 Under S 302(a)(2) a person's state of mind is "intentional" with respect to a result of his conduct if it
is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result. Feinberg, Toward a New Approach to ProvingCulpability:
Mens Rea and the ProposedFederal Criminal Code, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 123 (1980).
197 Section 302(b) provides that a person's state of mind is "knowing" with respect to an existing circumstance if he is aware or believes that the circumstance exists. Feinberg, supra note 196 at 132.
198 See Senate Report on S. 1722, supra note 193, at 336.
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the object in a proceeding that is in being or likely to be instituted that is the
focus of this section."1 99 The Senate Report goes on to specify that document
destruction will not violate the section unless the actual pendency or likelihood
of a proceeding is proven.2 00
Distinguishing between proof of knowledge of a proceeding and proof of
the existence of a proceeding may exalt form over substance, since it is difficult
to prove the former without proving the latter. As the National Commission
noted, "proof of belief will usually depend on what actually fostered the
belief-a proceeding, pending or contemplated." ' 20 1 Thus, proof of the existence of a pending or likely proceeding would ordinarily form the basis for
demonstrating the actor's knowledge of that proceeding.
However, in some circumstances the additional requirement of proving
the existence of a proceeding might be significant. For example, if an actor's attorney mistakenly advises that an official proceeding is likely, the actor might
destroy documents under this assumption. 20 2 Under the Senate Report's formulation, this behavior would not appear culpable because there is, in fact, no
pending or likely proceeding. Under the literal terms of the provision,
however, the behavior would be culpable since at the time it occurred the actor
believed a proceeding was likely to be initiated. Thus, potential violators are
granted less protection under a literal interpretation of the statute than under
the Judiciary Committee's interpretation.
Subsection (b) of section 1325 creates a presumption that document
destruction occurring in the ordinary course of business pursuant to a
"regular" destruction program has a legitimate purpose. A party who destroys
documents under these circumstances is presumed not to have the requisite
specific intent to prevent the documents' use in an official proceeding.203 This
provision should bar successful prosecutions where records have been
destroyed pursuant to a "regular" program. Specific intent to hamper an official proceeding is an essential element of a section 1325 violation, and as such
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 0 4 If a presumption exists that such
a specific intent did not accompany document destruction because it was done
pursuant to a regular destruction program, it would appear virtually impossible to prove the requisite specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
The version of section 1325 reported out of Committee precludes only one
defense. Section 1325(c) provides that the fact that evidence tampered with
would have been legally privileged or inadmissible is not a defense. This
preclusion effectively overrules Neal v. United States, 205 which held that concealing relevant items had not hindered law enforcement because the evidentiary
nature of the items had not been established. 20 6 The preclusion is intended to
199
search
would
200
201
202
203
204
205
206

Id. By way of example, the Senate Report states that destruction of records to avoid execution of a
warrant or other process, or to avoid an audit which was likely to lead to an official proceeding,
most likely be condemned under the section.
Id. at 337.
I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 181, at 575.
Cf 1979 Hearings, supra note 189, at 9979 (testimony of George Freeman).
Senate Report on S. 1722, supra note 193, at 337.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
102 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 679 (1941).
See notation on Neal in discussion of § 1311(c) in Senate Report on S. 1722, supra note 193, at 297. See also
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ensure that all determinations as to the existence of a legal privilege or the admissibility of evidence are made by a judge in the courtroom rather than by a
private party considering whether to destroy particular documents.20 7 The
essence of the offense is intentionally destroying evidence to make it
unavailable to the government; it is irrelevant that other lawful means such as
privilege or inadmissibility may render the evidence unavailable to the govern2 08
ment.
The preclusion of the defense of inadmissibility apparently extends to a
defense based solely on the nonmateriality of the evidence tampered with. In
hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, representatives of the Amercan Bar Association argued that the scope of section 1325(c) is too great
because it literally precludes the defense that the documents destroyed were immaterial and irrelevant to the proceeding.2 0 9 The Committee was asked to
amend the section to preclude only the defense that the documents destroyed
were legally privileged. The Committee, however, left the expansive preclusion
intact, presumably so that the prosecution could focus on the defendant's
tampering with evidence rather than.on questions of evidence admissibility, including materiality or relevance. This issue may be of little practical
significance, since proof that the defendant intended to interfere with a pending
or likely proceeding requires proof that the evidence he tampered with was
material to that proceeding.
Section 1325(d) provides federal jurisdiction over the offense if the official
proceeding involved is or might become a federal official proceeding. The term
"official proceeding" is broadly defined in section 111 to include any proceeding
[c]onvened pursuant to lawful authority, or a portion of such a proceeding,
that is or may be heard before (a) a government branch or agency; or (b) a
public servant who is authorized to take oaths, including a judge, a chairman
or a Member of Congress authorized by a legislative committee or subcommittee, a bankruptcy
judge, an administrative law judge, a hearing examiner
210
and a notary.
Thus, "official proceeding" embraces not only grand jury proceedings and
criminal trials but civil proceedings before federal administrative or regulatory
211
agencies as well.
Section 1325's description of its federal jurisdictional base is consistent
with S. 1722's general approach of drafting offenses solely in terms of the requisite conduct and mental state, then detailing separately the circumstances
which create federal jurisdiction over such offenses. 212 Thus, an offense occurs
1979 Hearings, supra note 189, at 10177 (statement ofJohn.Shattuck on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union).
207 See Legislation to Revise and Recodify Federal CriminalLaw: Hearings on H.R. 6869 Before the Subcomm. on
CriminalJusticeof the House Comm. on theJudiciay, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 143-44 (1978) (statement of
Department of justice).
208 Id. at 144.
209 1979 Hearings, supra note 189, at 9977-78 (testimony of George Freeman).
210 S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 1325(d) (1979).
211 See Note, supra note 190, at 790.
212 See Senate Report on S. 1722, supra note 193, at 30; I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 181, at 578.
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under 1325(a) if a person tampers with physical evidence with intent to impair
its integrity or its availability for use in an official proceeding. Federal jurisdiction over the offense exists under section 1325(d) if the official proceeding is a
federal official proceeding.
b. Section 1323: Tampering with a Witness, Victim or an Informant
Two components of section 1323,213 neither of which was revised during
the Committee markup, are applicable to the destruction of documents. First,
subsection (a)(1)(B)(ii) criminalizes the use of force, threat, intimidation, or
213 Section 1323 (Tampering With a Witness, Victim or an Informant) as contained in S. 1722 (96th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1979) and reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee reads as follows:
(a) Offense. A person is guilty of an offense if he(1) uses force, threat, intimidation, or deception with intent to(A) influence the testimony of another person in an official proceeding; or
(B) cause or induce another person to(i) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object, from an
official proceeding;
(ii) engage in conduct constituting an offense under section 1325 (Tampering
With Physical Evidence);
(iii) evade legal process summoning him to appear as a witness, or to produce a
record, document, or other object, in an official proceeding; or
(iv) absent himself from an official proceeding to which he has been summoned
by legal process; or
(C) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer of information relating to an offense or a possible offense;
(2) with intent to annoy, harm, or injure another person, hinders, delays, prevents, or
dissuades(A) a witness or a victim from attending or testifying in an official proceeding; or
(B) a witness, victim, or a person acting on behalf of a victim, from(i) making a report of an offense or a possible offense to a judge, a law enforcement officer, a probation officer, or an officer of a correctional facility;
(ii) causing a criminal prosecution, or a parole or probation revocation proceeding, to be sought or instituted or assisting in such prosecution or proceeding; or
(iii) arresting, or causing or seeking the arrest of, a person in connection with an
offense; or
(3) does any other act with intent to influence improperly, or to obstruct or impair, the(A) administration ofjustice;
(B) administration of a law under which an official proceeding is being or may be
conducted; or
(C) exercise of a legislative power of inquiry.
(b) Definitions ...
(c) Affirmative Defense. It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under subsection
(a)(1)(A) that the conduct engaged in to threaten or to intimidate consisted solely of lawful conduct and that the defendant's sole intention was to compel or induce the other person to testify
truthfully.
(d) Defense Precluded. It is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that(1) an official proceeding was not pending or about to be instituted; or
(2) the testimony, or the record, document, or other object, would have been legally
privileged or would have been inadmissible in evidence.
(e) Grading. An offense described in this section is(1) a Class D felony in the circumstances set forth in subsection (a)(1); and
(2) a Class E felony in the circumstances set forth in subsection (a)(2) or (a)(3).
() Jurisdiction. There is federal jurisdiction over an offense described in this section if(1) the official proceeding, offense, or prosecution is or would be a federal official proceeding, offense, or prosecution;
(2) the officer is a federal public servant and the information or report relates to a federal
offense or a possible federal offense.
(3) the administration of justice, administration of a law, or exercise of a legislative
power of inquiry relates to a federal government function;
(4) the United States mail or a facility in interstate or foreign commerce is used in the
planning, promotion, management, execution, consummation, or concealment of the offense, or in the distribution of the proceeds of the offense; or
(5) movement of a person across a State or United States boundary occurs in the planning, promotion, management, execution, consummation, or concealment of the offense or
in the distribution of the proceeds of the offense.
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deception with intent to induce another person to engage in conduct constituting an offense under section 1325. Because the subsection contains no
provision concerning the actor's state of mind, culpability depends upon
"knowledge" or awareness of the nature of the conduct. 2 14 The offender must
intend to induce the third party to violate section 1325. However, there is no
requirement of proof that the defendant knew the third party's conduct would
violate section 1325.2 1 5 Section 303(d)(1)(A) 2 16 provides that proof of
knowledge that particular conduct constitutes a specific statutory offense is not
ordinarily required. Thus, under section 1323 the offender must simply intend
that the third party engage in conduct that violates section 1325.
Unlike section 1325, section 1323 precludes the defense that an official
proceeding was not pending or about to be instituted. The National Commission concluded that inducing another person to tamper with evidence is not as
ambiguous an act as destroying one's own records or documents. 2 17 Therefore,
the offender's belief in the existence of a pending or likely proceeding is not
necessary for proving the requisite illegitimate purpose. 218 Section 1323(d)
does, however, contain the defense preclusion of section 1325 relating to
privilege and admissibility of evidence.
Second, section 1323(a)(3) contains a general residual clause rendering a
person guilty of an offense if he "does any other act with intent to influence improperly, or to obstruct or impair, the administration of justice, the administration of a law under which an official proceeding is being conducted, or the exercise of a legislative power of inquiry.' '219 The provision derives from the
general residual clauses concerning the obstruction of the administration of
justice found at the end of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 and 1505.220 This broad clause
could be applied to the destruction of evidence specifically proscribed in section
1325, even though it contains fewer required elements for conviction than does
section 1325. Unlike section 1325, section 1323(a)(3) requires only that the
defendant specifically intend to obstruct or impair the administration ofjustice,
not that he know of a pending or likely proceeding or that such a proceeding actually exist.
However, two considerations suggest that the courts will likely not allow
section 1323 to reach destruction of documents that could not be prosecuted
under section 1325. First, the existing generalized statutes from which the
residual clause derives have been narrowly construed by the courts. 221 The rationale for such narrow interpretations, that criminal statutes do not authorize
broad prosecutorial discretion to determine what constitutes a crime, 222 appears equally applicable to the residual clause in section 1323.
Second, the Senate Report states that the residual clause was included to
proscribe only obstructions of justice not otherwise covered in the Code:
214
215
216

S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(b) (1979).
See Senate Report on S. 1722, supra note 193, at 332 n.47.
S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 303(d)(1)(A) (1979).

217

I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 181, at 575.

218 See Note, supra note 190, at 790.
219 S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1323(a)(3) (1979).
220 Id. at 330. 18 U.S.C. §5 1503 and 1505 are set out in notes 69-70 supra.
221 See, e.g., Falk v. United States, 370 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 926 (1967); Haili
v. United States, 260 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1958).
222 1 WORKINO PAPERS, supra note 181, at 568.
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The purpose of preventing an obstruction ... ofjustice cannot fully be carried
out by a simple enumeration of the commonly prosecuted obstruction ofis
fenses. There must also be a protection against the rare type of conduct that2 23
the product of the inventive criminal mind and which also thwarts justice.
Thus, the residual clause does not apply to the "commonly" prosecuted
obstruction of justice offense of tampering with physical evidence specifically
enumerated elsewhere in the Code. Accordingly, a court would be unlikely to
authorize use of section 1323(a)(3) as a prosecutorial tool against the destruction of documents.
Federal jurisdiction under section 1323 would usually stem from the
underlying section 1325 violation that the actor intends to induce. If the official
proceeding that the actor intends to affect is a federal one, the jurisdictional requirement would be met.
A section 1323 violation is a Class D felony punishable by up to five years
in prison. Section 1323's higher penalty evidences the drafters' belief that
evidence is a more serious offense than
coercing a third party to tamper with
224
personally destroying documents.
c. Section 1322: Corruptinga Witness or an Informant
Section
223
224
225
1979)

1322225 generally

parallels section

1323,

but in subsection

Senate Report on S. 1722, supra note 193, at 330.
Id. at 337.
Section 1322 (Corrupting a Witness or an Informant) as contained in S. 1722 (96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
and reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee reads as follows:
(a) Offense. A person is guilty of an offense if he(1) offers, gives, or agrees to give to another person, or solicits, demands, accepts, or
agrees to accept from another person, anything of value for or because of any person's(A) testimony in an official proceeding;
(B) withholding testimony, or withholding a record, document, or other object, from
an official proceeding;
(C) engaging in conduct constituting an offense under section 1325 (Tampering
With Physical Evidence);
(D) evading legal process summoning him to appear as a witness, or to produce a
record, document, or other object, in an official proceeding; or
(E) absenting himself from an official proceeding to which he has been summoned by
legal process; or
(2) offers, gives, or agrees to give anything of value to another person for or because of
any person's hindering, delaying, or preventing the communication to a law enforcement officer of information relating to an offense or a possible offense.
(b) Defense Precluded. It is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that(1) an official proceeding was not pending or about to be instituted;
(2) the testimony, or the record, document, or other object, would have been legally
privileged or would have been inadmissible in evidence; or
(3) the defendant, or other recipient or proposed recipient of the thing of value, by the
same conduct also committed an offense described in section 1722 (Extortion), 1723
(Blackmail), or 1731 (Theft).
(c) Grading. An offense described in this section is a Class E felony.
(d) Jurisdiction. There is federal jurisdiction over an offense described in this section if(1) the official proceeding is or would be a federal official proceeding;
(2) the law enforcement officer is a federal public servant and the information relates to a
federal offense or a possible federal offense;
(3) the United States mail or a facility in interstate or foreign commerce is used in the
planning, promotion, management, execution, consummation, or concealment of the offense, or in the distribution of the proceeds of the offense; or
(4) movement of a person across a State or United States boundary occurs in the planning, promotion, management, execution, consummation, or concealment of the offense, or
in the distribution of the proceeds of the offense.
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(a)(1)(C) condemns bribing another person to engage in a section 1325 offense.
Section 1322 was not revised during Committee markup.
Section 1322(a)(1) defines culpable conduct as offering, giving or agreeing
to give to another person, or agreeing to accept, anything of value to engage in
at least one of five acts. Included among these acts is engaging in conduct that
would constitute an offense under section 132 5. 2 26 Since no culpability standard is designated, the prosecution must prove that the defendant had
"knowledge" of the nature of his activity. 227 It must also be established that
what is offered, given or demanded is "anything of value." ' 228 "Anything of
value" is defined broadly in section 111 to include "any direct or indirect gain
or advantage."
Section 1322 contains the same defense preclusions as section 1323
concerning inadmissibility of evidence and official proceedings not pending. As
in section 1323, section 1322's proscribed conduct, bribing another person to
destroy documents, is not as inherently ambiguous as personally destroying
evidence.
The jurisdictional base of section 1322 is identical to that in section 1323.
If the obstructive conduct effectuated by the bribery would involve a federal official proceeding, federal jurisdiction may be asserted.
d. Section 1311: HinderingLaw Enforcement
Section 1311229 is the final section in S. 1722 relating to the destruction of
226 The fact the conduct is in violation of § 1325 requires no proof of culpability.
227 S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(b) (1979).
228 See Senate Report on S. 1722, supra note 193, at 325. Section 303(b)(2) clarifies that the state of mind
with regard to an existing circumstance required for culpability is that of "recklessness." Thus, the defendant must have been aware of the risk that he was providing something of value, yet disregarded that risk.
229 Section 1311 (Hindering Law Enforcement) as contained in S. 1722 (96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1979) as
reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee reads as follows:
(a) Offense. A person is guilty of an offense if he(1) interferes with, hinders, delays, or prevents the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another person, knowing that such other person has committed a crime, or is charged with or being sought for a crime, by(A) harboring the other person or affirmatively concealing him or his identity;
(B) providing the other person with a weapon, money, transportation, disguise, or
other means of avoiding or minimizing the risk of discovery or apprehension;
(C) warning the other person of impending discovery or apprehension; or
(2) intentionally interferes with, hinders, delays, or prevents the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another person, knowing that such other person has committed a crime, or is charged with or being sought for a crime, by altering,
destroying, mutilating, affirmatively concealing, or removing a record, document, or other

object; or
(3) aids another person to secrete, disguise, or convert the proceeds of a crime or otherwise to profit from a crime.
(b) Affirmative Defense. It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under subsection
(a)(l)(C), and to a prosecution under any section incorporating by reference the provisions of
subparagraph (C) of subsection (a)(1), that warning was made solely in an effort to bring the
other person into compliance with the law.
(c) Defense Precluded. It is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that the record,
document, or other object would have been legally privileged or would have been inadmissible in
evidence.
(d) Grading. An offense described in this section is(1) a Class D felony if the other person's crime is a Class A, B, or C felony, and the actor
knows the general nature of the crime or is reckless with regard to the general nature of the
crime;
(2) a Class E felony if(A) the other person's crime is a Class D felony, and the actor knows the general
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documents. In general, section 1311 proscribes assisting others to either avoid
apprehension or prosecution or to profit from the fruits of their crimes.
The original section 1311(a)(1)(D) related to the destruction of
documents. The subsection made it an offense to interfere with, delay or prevent the discovery, prosecution or conviction of another person, knowing such
other person had committed a crime or was being sought for a crime, by "altering, destroying, mutilating, concealing, or removing a record, document or
other object." This provision was criticized as providing an insufficient standard of culpability regarding actual tampering with evidence, since it required
mere awareness or "knowledge" that destruction of documents would hinder
apprehension of a fugitive. Several groups testified that a higher level of
culpability should be required to protect potential violators, 230 because document destruction is an inherently ambiguous activity when performed as part
of an ongoing records management program.
Persuaded by these comments, the Judiciary Committee revised the provision to require proof of an "intentional" state of mind. The amended provision
requires proof that the defendant "intentionally" interfered with law enforcement by destroying documents. Under revised section 131 1(a)(2), the defendant must intend by the act of destruction to interfere with or otherwise hinder
23 1
the apprehension or prosecution of a fugitive.
As presently written, section 1311(a)(2) generally parallels section 1325
but applies to actions hindering law enforcement efforts as opposed to those interfering with a pending or contemplated official proceeding. The prohibited
conduct (altering, hiding, or destroying physical evidence) is the same. Three
states of mind must accompany this conduct. First, the offender must "know"
that the third party assisted by the destruction of documents has committed, is
charged with or is being sought for a crime. 232 Second, as noted above, the offender must specifically intend to interfere with the apprehension or prosecution of a fugitive by destroying documents. Third, since no specific culpability
level is enumerated with respect to the proscribed conduct, the defendant must
"know" or be "aware" that he has destroyed a document.
Two existing circumstances are also elements of the offense. First, the
destruction of documents must interfere with, hinder or otherwise delay the apprehension or prosecution of a third person. 233 Second, according to the Senate
nature of the conduct constituting such crime or is reckless with regard to the general
nature of such conduct; or
(B) the defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value; and
(3) a Class A misdemeanor in any other case.
(e) Jurisdiction. There is federal jurisdiction over an offense described in this section if the
crime that the other person has committed, is charged with, is being sought for, or is seeking to
profit from, is a crime over which federal jurisdiction exists.
230 See, e.g., 1979 Hearings, supra note 189, at 10177 (testimony of John Shattuck on behalf of the
American Civil Liberties Union).
231 See Senate Report on S. 1722, supra note 193, at 295; Staff of SenateJudiciary Committee, Memorandum
on Federal Criminal Code Reform Act of1979 at 19 (1979) (unpublished memorandum in SenateJudiciary Committee library).
232 This requirement was criticized during hearings because of the "unfairness" of requiring that a
layman decide whether a person has "committed a crime" when the person is not so charged or sought by
law enforcement officers. See 1979 Hearings, supra note 189, at 10079 (testimony of Irving S. Shapiro). The
Judiciary Committee rejected this argument and the language was left intact.
233 See Senate Report on S. 1722, supra note 193, at 298.
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Report, the person being assisted must have committed a crime or be charged
with a crime. 23 4 This second requirement is not apparent in the statutory
language, which merely requires "knowledge" or a belief that an individual
has committed or is being sought for a crime.
Subsection (2) contains the same defense preclusion as does section 1325;
it is not a defense that a destroyed document would have been privileged or inadmissible in evidence.
If the crime the third person has committed, is charged with or is being
sought for is a crime over which federal jurisdiction exists, federal jurisdiction
may be asserted over the subsection (2) offense. The accused need not know
that the assisted party committed a federal crime; the fact that the crime committed was a federal offense is enough for jurisdictional purposes.
The offense is graded according to the severity of the underlying offense
and the defendant's culpability with respect to the details of the crime. If the
crime with which the assisted person has been charged is a Class A, B, or C
felony, and the actor knew the nature of the conduct constituting the crime, the
offense of the aider is a Class D felony punishable by up to five years in prison.
If the underlying crime is a Class D felony or if the aider committed the subsection (a)(2) offense in exchange for something of pecuniary value, the offense is
a Class E felony punishable by up to two years in prison. In all other cases, the
subsection (a)(2) offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
3. Provisions Applicable to Document Destruction in H.R. 6915
Because the House bill generally contains sections which parallel the provisions of S. 1722, this discussion focuses on differences in the House provisions relevant to the destruction of documents.
a. Section 1725: Tampering with PhysicalEvidence
Section 1725235 is the principal provision in H.R. 6915 applicable to the
234 Id. at 295.
235 Section 1725 (Tampering with Physical Evidence) as contained in H.R. 6915 (96th Cong., 2d Sess.,
1980) and reported out of the House Judiciary Committee reads as follows:
(a) Whoever, with intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official
proceeding that is pending, knowingly alters, destroys, or mutilates a record, document, or other
object, or engages in any act and thereby conceals such an object, or attempts to do so, commits a
class E felony.
(b) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that the record, document,
or object would not have been material to the official proceeding.
(c) Except as provided in subsection (b) of the section, it is not a defense to a prosecution
under this section that the record, document, or other object would have been legally privileged
or would have been inadmissible in evidence.
(d) As used in this section, the term "to conceal" used with respect to a document, record,
or other object, does not include an express refusal to relinquish possession of, or reveal the contents of, such document, record, or object.
(e)(1) For the purposes of this section, a falsification, omission, concealment, forgery, alteration, or other misleading matter is material, regardless of the admissibility of the statement or object under the rules of evidence, if(A) in a grand jury proceeding, such misleading matter has a natural tendency to influence, impede, or dissuade the grand jury from pursuing such grand jury's investigations;
or
(B) in any other proceeding, such misleading matter is capable of influencing the person
to whom such misleading matter is presented on the issue before such person.
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destruction of documents and parallels section 1325 of S. 1722. As originally
introduced, section 1725 made it a crime to knowingly destroy or conceal
physical evidence with intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for
use in an official proceeding pending or about to be initiated. The object's inadmissibility in evidence was precluded as a defense unless the object would
not have been material to the official proceeding. The provision underwent two
important changes during Subcommittee markup. First, subsection (d) was
added to emphasize that documents are not "concealed" by parties who expressly refuse to relinquish possession of them. This provision responded to
concerns of the press that a refusal to furnish documents revealing informants'
identities would be criminalized even if the documents' existence were openly
acknowledged. Second, subsection (a) was amended to delete the phrase "or
about to be initiated." Thus, destruction or concealment of evidence is
criminalized only if it occurs while an official proceeding is pending.
Section 1725 as reported out of Committee involves substantially the same
offense elements as section 1325 of S. 1722. Both sections proscribe altering,
destroying, or mutilating physical evidence with intent to impair its integrity or
its availability for use in an official proceeding. Like S. 1722, H.R. 6915 provides that where no state of mind is specified for violative conduct, "knowing"
is the required culpability level. Thus, the defendant must "know" 236 he has
tampered with evidence.
A pending proceeding is an existing circumstance that must be
demonstrated. According to section 302(b), the state of mind required regarding existing circumstances is the same as the state of mind required for the conduct. Therefore, the offender must be shown to have "known" a proceeding
was pending.
The only major difference in the elements of the offense under section
1725(a) and section 1325(a) concerns the stage of the proceeding present and
known to the defendant. Section 1325(a) requires that a proceeding be pending
or likely to exist, while section 1725(a) requires that a proceeding be pending.
Like section 1325, section 1725(c) precludes the defenses of legal privilege
and inadmissibility of evidence. Unlike section 1325, however, section 1725(b)
specifically excepts from this preclusion the defense that the evidence would not
have been material to the proceeding. Subsection 1725(e) defines materiality in
terms of its natural tendency to influence or impede a grand jury investigation,
or its capability to influence the person to whom the evidence would have been
presented. Materiality is a question of law to be determined by the judge.
The jurisdictional base provided in section 1725 resembles that provided
in section 1325 of S. 1722. The offense is a Class E felony punishable by imprisonment of up to 18 months.

(2) Whether a matter is material under the circumstances is a question of law.
(0 There is Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section if the official proceeding is
or would be a Federal official proceeding.
236 "Knowing" is defined in § 301(c) as "awareness" or "firm belief" that a circumstance exists. See
Feinberg, supra note 196.
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b. Section 1723: Tampering with a Witness or an Informant
Section 1723237 parallels section 1323(a)(1)(B)(ii) of S. 1722. The original
section made it a crime to use force, threat, intimidation or fraud with intent to
induce another person to engage in conduct constituting an offense under section 1725. It did not require that the offender "know" that the third party's
conduct violated section 1725, but only that he intend to induce the destruction
of records and that the destruction constituted a section 1725 violation.
However, the provision was changed during Subcommittee markup to provide
that the offender must have the "conscious objective" of causing the third party to violate section 1725. It is more difficult to prove such intent than it is to
prove that the offender simply intended conduct which constituted a section
1725 violation.
As presently written, section 1723(a)(2)(B) proscribes using force, threat,
fraud or deception if that conduct is accompanied by two mens rea elements: the
offender must "know" or be aware that he is employing force or deception,
and he must specifically "intend" to induce a section 1725 violation through
the use of such force or deception.
Section 1723 contains neither of the defense preclusions contained in section 1323 of S. 1722. Thus, an offender could assert the affirmative defense
that (1) an official proceeding was not pending or likely to be instituted, or (2)
238
the documents destroyed would be privileged or inadmissible in evidence.
Section 1723's jurisdictional'base is identical to that in section 1323 of S.
1722. The offense is a Class D felony, punishable by up to 40 months' imprisonment, thus echoing the Senate's sentiment that coercing a third party to
destroy evidence is a more serious crime than personally destroying
documents.

237 Section 1723 (Tampering with a Witness or an Informant) as contained in H.R. 6915 (96th Cong.,
2d Sess., 1980) and reported out of the House Judiciary Committee reads as follows:
(a) Whoever knowingly uses physical force, threat, intimidation, or fraud with intent to-

(1) influence the testimony of another person in an official proceeding; or
(2) cause or induce another person to(A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object, from an of-

ficial proceeding;
(B) violate section 1725 (relating to tampering with physical evidence),

1732

(relating to failing to appear as a witness), 1733 (relating to refusing to produce information), or 1734 (relating to refusing to testify) of this title; or
(C) evade legal process summoning that other person to appear as a witness, or to
produce a record, document, or other object, in an official proceeding; or
(3) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer of information relating to an offense or a possible offense;
commits a class D felony.
(b) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under subsection (a)(1) of this section that the
threat or intimidation consisted solely of lawful conduct and that the defendant's sole intention
was to compel or induce the other person to testify truthfully.

(c) There is Federal jurisdiction (including extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction) over an offense under this section if(1) the official proceeding is or would be a Federal official proceeding; or
(2) the law enforcement officer is a Federal public servant and the information relates to
a Federal offense or a possible Federal offense.
238 It is difficult to perceive the rationale for the failure to preclude the latter defense since it is precluded
in 5 1725 except with respect to a claim of nonmateriality. Perhaps, the Subcommittee felt the defense
preclusion would be redundant because the offender must intend to cause a § 1725 violation and the defense
is precluded in that section. If this is accurate, it is not clear from the language of the provision.
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c. Section 1729: Obstruction of Official Proceedings by Fraud
Section 1729239 parallels the residual provision of section 1323(a)(3) in S.
1722. The original section 1729, introduced in H.R. 6233, made it an offense
to knowingly employ fraud in order to impair an official proceeding. This provision was modified in significant respects during Subcommittee markup as a
result of criticism that the original provision could be used to criminalize
legitimate activity. As modified, section 1729 provides that the offender must
intentionally obstruct the due administration ofjustice in a judicial proceeding,
the due administration of the law under which an official proceeding is being
conducted, or the due exercise of power of inquiry conducted by either House
of Congress. In response to testimony that the original provision might be applied against a defendant or attorney who merely presented a legitimate
defense or preserved a valid interest, 24 0 two affirmative defenses were explicitly
recognized: first, the actor was an attorney and his conduct constituted an
ethical representation of the client's interests; and second, the defendant's conduct was an assertion of constitutional rights.
Except for these two affirmative defenses, section 1729 parallels the
residual clause in S. 1722, section 1323(a)(3), and is applicable to the destruction of documents. Although the term "fraud" is not defined in H.R. 6915, it
could include the impairment of physical evidence. 241 However, the courts will
not likely allow section 1729 to be used to reach the destruction of documents
not meeting the requirements of section 1725. Section 1729 is obviously intended to reach forms of obstructing justice not specifically enumerated elsewhere
in the Code.
d. Section 1721: Witness Bribery and Graft
Section 1721242 parallels, in pertinent part, section 1322(a)(1)(C) of S.
239 Section 1729 (Obstruction of Official Proceedings by Fraud) as contained in H.R. 6915 (96th Cong.,
2d Sess., 1980) and reported out of the House Judiciary Committee reads as follows:
(a) Whoever knowingly uses fraud and thereby intentionally obstructs or impairs the due administration ofjustice in ajudicial proceeding, the due administration of the law under which an
official proceeding is being conducted, or the due exercise of the power of inquiry under which an
inquiry is being conducted by either House of Congress or any committee of Congress, or attempts to do so, commits a class D felony.
(b) It is a defense to a prosecution for an offense under this section that(1) the actor was an attorney, and the conduct in which the actor engaged constituted an
ethical representation of a client's interests; or
(2) the conduct in which the actor engaged was the assertion of the actor's constitutional
rights.
(c) There is Federal jurisdiction (including extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction) over an offense under this section if the official proceeding is a Federal official proceeding.
240 See, e.g., 1979 Hearings, supra note 189, at 10416 (position paper of Federal Public and Community
Defenders).
241 Id.
242 Section 1721 (Witness Bribery and Graft) as contained in H.R. 6915 (96th Cong., 2d Sess., 1980)
and reported out of the House Judiciary Committee reads as follows:
(a) Whoever knowingly(1) offers, gives, or agrees to give anything of value to another person, with intent to influence or reward such other person with regard to such other person's(A) testimony in an official proceeding;
(B) withholding testimony, or withholding a record, document, or other object, from
an official proceeding;
(C) violating section 1725 (relating to tampering with physical evidence), 1731
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1722. As originally introduced, section 1721(a)(1)(C) and (a)(2)(A) proscribed
persons from offering or accepting anything of value with the intent to reward a
third person for or because of that person's engaging in conduct constituting an
offense under section 1725. Subsection (a)(1)(C) was revised during Subcommittee markup to require that the offender intend to influence the third person
to "violate" section 1725. This revision is identical to the markup change
made to section 1723(a)(2)(B); both changes raise the degree of culpability that
must be proven. Instead of requiring only that the defendant intend to bribe a
third person to commit acts violative of section 1725, the provision now requires that the defendant specifically intend the third person to destroy
evidence in violation of that section. As a result of this revision, it is considerably more difficult to prove that document destruction violates section
1721 than that it violates section 1322 of S. 1722. Although most of the requirements of the two sections are identical, the mens rea requirement of section
1721 is stricter than that of section 1322.243
Like section 1322, section 1721 precludes the two defenses of lack of a
pending official proceeding and inadmissibility of evidence, and requires the
presence of a federal official proceeding in the underlying section 1725 offense
for federal jurisdiction to exist. The offense is a Class C felony, punishable by
up to 80 months' imprisonment, as contrasted with the Class E status provided
section 1322 offenses.
e. Section 1711: HinderingLaw Enforcement
Section 1711,244 which was not significantly changed during Subcommit(relating to criminal contempt), 1732 (relating to failing to appear as a witness), or 1733
(relating to refusing to produce information) of this title; or
(D) evading legal process summoning such other person to appear as a witness, or to
produce a record, document, or other object, in an official proceeding; or
(2) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept from another person anything of value(A) because of the actor's engaging in conduct specified in subsection (a)(1)(A)
through (a)(1)(D) of this section; or
(B) that is given with the specific intent described in subsection (a)(1) of this section;
commits a class C felony.
(b) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that(1) an official proceeding was not pending or about to be instituted; or
(2) the testimony, or the record, document, or other object, would have been legally
privileged or would have been inadmissible in evidence.
(c) There is Federal jurisdiction (including extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction) over an offense under this section if the official proceeding is or would be a Federal official proceeding.
243 Section 1322 only requires that the defendant has the purpose of causing conduct that is independently found to violate § 1325.
244 Section 1711 (Hindering Law Enforcement) as contained in H.R. 6915 (96th Cong., 2d Sess., 1980)
and reported out of the House Judiciary Committee reads as follows:
(a) Whoever, if a crime has been committed and another person is charged with or being
sought for a crime, knowingly(1) harbors that person, or engages in any act and thereby conceals that person;
(2) provides that person with a weapon, money, transportation, disguise, or other means
of avoiding or minimizing the risk of discovery or apprehension;
(3) warns that person of impending discovery or apprehension; or
(4) alters, destroys, or mutilates, a record, document, or other object or engages in any
act and thereby conceals such an object;
and thereby intentionally interferes with, hinders, delays, or prevents the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of that person, shall be punished as provided in
subsection (b) of this section.
(b) An offense under this section is(1) a class D felony if the other person's crime is a class A, B, or C felony, and the actor is
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tee or Comittee markup, parallels section 131 1(a)(2) of S. 1722. The two provisions prohibit identical conduct: the defendant must intentionally hinder law
enforcement efforts to apprehend or prosecute a third person by altering,
mutilating, concealing or destroying documents. The only potential discrepancy between the two provisions concerns the existing circumstance requirement
that the third person must actually have committed a crime. Section 1311 of S.
1722 requires the defendant to "know" that the person he aids has committed,
is charged with, or is being sought for a crime. The Senate Report on S. 1722
states that this language implicitly requires the existing circumstance that the
third person has committed, is charged with, or is being sought for a crime.
Under the latter two circumstances, a defendant who destroys documents
could be convicted even if the person he aids never committed a crime. 245 Section 1711(a), on the other hand, expressly provides that the third person must
actually commit a crime for the person who aids him to be criminally liable.
Under this section, an offense exists only "if a crime has been committed and
2 46
another person is being charged with or sought for" the crime.
Like section 1311 of S. 1722, section 1711 precludes the defense that the
destroyed documents would have been privileged or inadmissible. Unlike section 1725, section 1711 does not limit this preclusion so as to prevent its extension to a defense based on nonmateriality of destroyed documents. This difference may be attributable to section 1711's existing circumstance requirement that the defendant's conduct actually interfere with or hinder a fugitive's
discovery or apprehension. Evidence that a concealed or destroyed document
was not material to the discovery or apprehension of the person sought tends to
defeat the existing circumstance element. Nonmateriality may thus be a simple
247
defense because it negates an essential element of the crime.
The grading scheme and jurisdictional basis for section 1711 are virtually
identical to those in section 1311 of S. 1722.

245
crime
246
247

reckless with regard to the general nature of the crime;
(2) a class E felony if(A) the other person's crime is a class D felony, and the actor is reckless with regard
to the general nature of such conduct; or
(B) the defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value; and
(3) a class A misdemeanor in any other case.
(c) In a prosecution for an offense under this section, no state of mind need be proved with
respect to the circumstance that the other person's crime is of a given class.
(d) As used in this section, the term "to conceal" used with respect to a document, record,
or other object, does not include an express refusal to relinquish possession of, or reveal the contents of, such document, record, or object.
(e) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for an offense under subsection (a)(3) of this
section, that warning was made solely in an effort to bring the other person into compliance with
the law.
() It is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that the record, document, or other
object would have been legally privileged or would have been inadmissible in evidence.
(g) There is Federal jurisdiction (including extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction) over an offense under this section if the crime for which the other person is charged or being sought is a
crime over which Federal jurisdiction exists.
Of course, if the third party is being sought for or is being charged with a crime, it is likely that a
has been committed.
H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1711(a) (1980).
1979 Hearings, supra note 189, at 10412 (testimony of Federal Public and Community Defenders).
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4. Prospects for Passage in the 96th Congress
Floor debate in the Senate and House on S. 1722 and H.R. 6915.wili soon
commence. It is uncertain whether the bills will pass the Senate and House and
whether the differences in the bills can be resolved by a Senate-House panel
before the close of the 96th Congress. The two bills differ in significant
respects, and several controversial amendments are planned in both the Senate
and the House. Also, both bills continue to receive criticism. The American
Civil Liberties Union has said that S. 1722 favors law enforcement and that
parts of H.R. 6915 threaten civil liberties. 248 The Department of Justice has
criticized H.R. 6915 for restricting federal efforts to combat public
corruption. 249 The bill's provisions regarding sentencing, bail and white-collar
250
crime have also been criticized.
The provisions of S. 1722 and H.R. 6915 applicable to wrongful destruction of documents are noncontroversial. No amendments relating to these provisions have been proposed in either the Senate or the House, and no proposed
revisions are expected. Whether a new federal criminal code is enacted in 1980
may depend on whether the "lame duck" session of the 96th Congress is willing to devote the time necessary to resolve the differences between the two bills
after the November 1980 elections.
V. Practical Considerations Relevant to the Destruction of Documents
A. Adverse Evidentiary Inference
Criminal obstruction of justice statutes have been applied in the destruction of documents context almost exclusively against parties who destroy relevant documents during judicial, administrative or congressional investigations
or proceedings. On a few occasions, courts have held destruction of relevant
documents during civil litigation violative of section 1503 or its predecessor.251
Although criminal prosecution for destruction of documents is a potent
weapon, parties in civil proceedings often exploit the conduct for its prejudicial
value at the civil trial, rather than initiate a separate criminal action. Principles
of evidence enable civil litigants to reap practical benefits at trial as a result of
destruction of relevant documents by opposing parties. An adverse but rebuttable evidentiary inference may be drawn concerning the strength of a party's
248 Hill Unit Clears Criminal Code Overhaul, Washington Post, July 3, 1980, at 2, col. 1; Revamp of U.S.
Criminal Code This Year Seen Still Alive As House Panel Votes Bill, Wall St. J., July 3, 1980, at 4, col. 5. Pear,
Crime Bill ChallengedBy Conservative Republicans, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1980, at A-18, col. 1.
249 Id.
250 Making the Crimes Fit the Times, TIME, Apr. 28, 1980, at 65, col. 1.
251 See, e.g., Wilder v. United States, 143 F. 433 (4th Cir. 1906), in which the court held:
The contention that a violation of section 5399 [predecessor to 1503], consisting of obstructing the administration ofjustice in a civil litigation, between private citizens in a federal court, is
not an offense against the United States, need not be discussed at any length. One of the
sovereign powers of the United States is to administer justice in its courts between private
citizens. Obstructing such administration is an offense against the United States, in that it
prevents or tends to prevent the execution of one of the powers of the government.
Id. at 440. Accord, Sneed v. United States, 298 F. 911, 912 (5th Cir. 1924) (offer to bribe juror during civil
proceeding impeded the administration ofjustice); cf. Miller v. Hulsey, 347 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Ark. 1972)
(section 1503 does not create a civil cause of action in favor of federal witnesses discharged from jobs by
private employers as retaliation).
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case if the party deliberately destroyed evidence to prevent its use in
litigation. 252 As Judge Learned Hand explained: "When a party is once found
to be fabricating, or suppressing documents, the natural, indeed inevitable
conclusion is that he has something to conceal, and is conscious of guilt. "253
The adverse inference arises only if the destructive act was accompanied by intentional conduct indicating fraud and a desire to suppress truth. 254 The inference may be rebutted upon a showing of the absence of evil intent or bad
255
faith.
An effective tactic to rebut the adverse inference is to demonstrate that the
destruction was part of a regular records management program. 256 Even
though a principal reason for adopting a program may be to keep sensitive
documents from investigations or official proceedings, a pre-existing program
is not intended to thwart a particular proceeding. In deference to the legitimate
purposes served by records management programs, courts allow routine
destruction to rebut the adverse inference. Courts are intolerant, however,
when the destroying party fails to offer a compelling reason for selective
destruction occurring outside the ordinary course of business and particularly
during litigation. 257 If no such reason exists, any adverse inference may be
countered by demonstrating that the documents have no relevance to the proceeding.258 However, the closer in time to a proceeding that destruction occurs,
the more pertinent the destroyed records are to the case, and the more difficult
is proof of inadvertent, good faith destruction. The adverse inference may also
be rebutted by showing the documents were destroyed either in reliance on the
260
259
or by accident.
advice of counsel
The adverse inference is strongest when documents are selectively
destroyed, since by its nature ad hoc destruction suggests corrupt intent. An ad
hoc destruction program instituted contemporaneously with the start of a pro252 See 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 291, at 221 (1979) (maxim of omnia praesumuntercontra spoliatorem).
253 Warner Barnes & Co. v. Kokosai Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, 102 F.2d 450, 453 (2d Cir. 1939).
254 Berthold-Jennings Lumber Co. v. St. Louis R.R., 80 F.2d 32, 42 (8th Cir. 1935) (intentional
destruction of waybills over nine years old not fraudulent), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 715 (1936).
255 Id.
256 See, e.g., Vick v. Texas Employment Commission, 514 F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1975) (no adverse inference from routine destruction provided no bad faith and well in advance of interrogatories seeking information from records); Wong v. Swier, 267 F.2d 749, 759 (9th Cir. 1959) (inference overcome by evidence
providing satisfactory explanation, even where actual tampering occurred); INA Aviation Corp. v. United
States, 468 F. Supp. 695 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (refusal to draw negative inference where destruction in accordance with routine record retention program or unintentional), aff'd, 610 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1979);
Millinocket Theatre, Inc. v. Kurson, 39 F. Supp. 979, 980 (D. Me. 1941) (destruction part of regular
routine). See also R. Borow & S. Baskin, supra note 1, at 241-46; Records Retention-The Lawyer's Role, supra
note 34, at 5-3.
257 See, e.g., Cecil Corley Motor Co., Ind. v. General Motors Corp., 380 F. Supp. 819, 859 (M. D.
Tenn. 1974) (strongest adverse inference drawn not only when documents destroyed while litigation pending, but while litigation being contemplated); Woolner Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 333 F.
Supp. 658, 661 (E.D. La. 1970) (destruction of basic records after time lapse and for legitimate reason is
regular business practice, but destruction out of regular course of business may be fraudulent).
258 In re Casket Mfrs. Ass'n of America, 52 F.T.C. 958, 970 (1956) (no inference drawn from destruction absent showing that mass of documents related to subject matter of case); Drosten v. Mueller, 103 Mo.
624, 15 S.W. 967 (1891) (reversing application of adverse inference because facts showed destroyed document was irrelevant to plaintiff's case).
259 See, e.g., In re Eno's Will, 196 A.D. 131, 187 N.Y.S. 756 (1921) (no adverse inference where letters
were burned on advice of a lawyer).
260 See, e.g., Universe Tankships, Inc. v. United States, 388 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (no adverse
inference where destruction showed mere negligence); Allen v. Commissioner, 117 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1941)
(no adverse inference where business records were destroyed by hurricane and flood).
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ceeding may permit a jury to infer that the destruction was intended to thwart
the proceeding. 261 However, a company that adheres to an established records
management program may be able to convince a jury that the potential
relevance of the documents had been innocently overlooked in the course of
other business. This attempted rebuttal may prove unsuccessful unless the
defendant company curtails its routine program after learning of documents'
relevance to foreseeable or pending investigations or proceedings. 262 The interruption of the routine program in such circumstances is vital to the success of
the rebuttal, since a company may be held culpable for its failure to stop an act
263
which it has a legal duty to prevent.
The trial judge will usually instruct the jury that failure to produce
evidence under one's control may indicate such evidence is unfavorable. 264 The
decision to draw the adverse inference is for the jury. 26- The adverse inference
is a permissible and not a mandatory presumption.
B. Other Considerations
An interesting but still unanswered question was raised in the early 1960's
by a letter from the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division to General
Motors Corp. (GM), informing GM that it was under investigation. The letter
directed GM, which had previously established a routine destruction program,
to suspend destruction of documents which it reasonably believed the grand
jury might request. 266 The district court refused to quash the letter upon GM's
motion, on grounds that it was not a court order. The court did not address the
question whether GM had an affirmative duty to halt the destruction program.
It also refused to issue a prospective protective order enabling the corporation
to avoid producing the documents once the subpoena issued. The court did,
261 R. Borow and S. Baskin, supra note 1, at 236.
262 Failure to stop a regular retention program may appear less corrupt than the taking of affirmative
steps to destroy records. An enterprise might argue that its failure to stop destruction resulted not from an
intent to interfere with a proceeding, but rather because its business structure delayed communication of the
existence of a relevant proceeding to those responsible for the record management program. Id. at 237-38.
263 See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., supra note 131 5 26 (1972).
264 For a sample jury instruction, see 2 E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS S 72.17 (3d ed. 1977) (Failure to Provide Available Evidence): "If a party fails to produce
evidence which is under his control and reasonably available to him and not reasonably available to the
adverse party, then you may infer that the evidence is unfavorable to the party who could have produced it
and did not."
265 See, e.g., Carr v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 384 F. Supp. 821, 831 (W.D. Ark. 1974)
(proper for jury to consider effect of destroyed record in determining actual facts, though the court did not
know why destruction occurred); Wong v. Swier, 267 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1959) (weight to be given tampering or suppression of evidence is forjury to decide); 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 5124 (1977) (destruction of documents- gives rise to permissible adverse inference, not
mandatory presumption); cf. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979) (proper for trial judge to instruct jury that expert witness' participation in concealing documents is relevant to
credibility), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1016 (1980); see also the decisions of the lower courts in Berkey Photo at 74
F.R.D. 613, 614 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) and 457 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Contra, Bird Provision Co. v.
Owens Country Sausage, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 744, 751 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (court may draw adverse inference
against party that destroys, alters or fabricates evidence), aff'd, 568 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1978); A.C. Becken
Co. v. Genex Corp., 199 F. Supp. 533, 544 (N.D. Ill. 1961) (destruction during pending litigation itself
constitutes an admission that documents are damaging to party's case), aff'd, 314 F.2d 839 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 816 (1963). But see International Union (UAW) v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(NLRB's failure to apply adverse inference against company that had refused for seven years to produce requested documents held reversible error).
266 In re Grand Jury Investigation (General Motors Corp.), 31 F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See also R.
Borow and S. Baskin, supra note 1, at 235; Beckstrom, supra note 26, at 704 n.56; Toll and Bauer, supra note
26, at 26.
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however, warn the government that failure to issue timely subpoenas informing GM of the documents believed to be relevant would "increase substantially
[the government's] burden under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 should it undertake a prosecution. "267 An investigation had commenced in the GM case, so that even if
the letter proved ineffective to halt GM's regular destruction program, it
nevertheless placed GM on notice of a pending agency investigation. Destruction of relevant documents after receipt of the letter
would have raised the
26
possibility of section 1505 or contempt penalties.
It is less clear whether an agency contemplating an investigation has
authority to mail form letters to all enterprises in a particular industry asking
them to temporarily halt their destruction programs. Those defying the request
might not only risk creating an adverse inference, but might also risk criminal
sanctions. More likely, however, such sweeping conduct would be found to exceed the agency's authority, or possibly to constitute an abuse of administrative
discretion. Nevertheless, since the letter would apprise the enterprises of an imminent or contemplated proceeding, it could serve a collateral purpose. If an
enterprise receiving the letter subsequently destroyed documents and was prosecuted for obstructing justice or for contempt, the letter could be admitted as
evidence showing that the enterprise had knowledge of a foreseeable proceeding.
Other consequences of documents destruction merit consideration. Under
certain circumstances, the Federal Rules of Evidence prevent a party who inexcusably destroys an original document from using secondary evidence to prove
its contents. 269 This rule may harm parties who dispose of original documents
which subsequently become helpful to their case.
The "Best Evidence Rule" does not preclude opposing parties from using
secondary evidence to prove the incriminating content of the original
documents. Nor does the rule exclude secondary evidence where the destroying
party, acting deliberately, had an erroneous impression regarding the consequences of the conduct. 270 The destroying party is barred from the use of secondary evidence only when the destruction rendering the original unavailable occurred without a valid excuse. 271 Such an excuse is provided by the existence of
a routine destruction program.
Despite the advantages of records management programs, some commentators have argued that routine destruction programs may do more harm than
good. 272 If a document containing exculpatory evidence is destroyed, an enterprise faces additional obstacles to introducing its contents into evidence. The
267 31 F.R.D. at 2.
268 See United States v. White, Crim. No. 78-00257 (D.D.C. June 2, 1978).
269 FED. R. EvID. 1004(1). See also Sellmayer Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 146 F.2d 707, 711 (4th Cir.
1944). For other consequences, see Cecil Corley Motor Co., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 380 F. Supp. 819
(M.D. Tenn. 1974) (where plaintiff destroyed records he must be given the burden of proof). See generally
note 45 supra.
270 Schroedl v. McTague, 256 Iowa 772, 129 N.W.2d 19, 23 (1964) (secondary evidence admissible to
prove contents of letters when plaintiffs destroyed originals, because letters were written over period of time
and plaintiff did not ordinarily keep old letters).
271 See 5 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
1002, at 1002-1 to 1002-19 (1978 & Supp. 1979) (reasons for best
evidence rule include prevention of fraud, susceptibility of secondary evidence to human and mechanical error, and importance of exact words).
272 R. Borow and S. Baskin, supra note 1, at 245; Baker, supra note 3, at 36; Beckstrom, supra note 26, at
687; Ellwood, The Problem of Old Files, 44 LAW INsT. J. 336, 340-41 (1970) (Australian periodical).
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business records exception to the Hearsay Rule allows a document recorded
during the ordinary course of business to be admitted at trial as substantive
evidence of the event. 27 3 This exception, which obviates the need to lay a foundation or to call as a witness the employee who recorded the information, is of
no help if the tangible record of the event has been destroyed.
VI. A Lawyer's Ethical Considerations in Counseling
Destruction of Documents
A. A.B.A. Code of ProfessionalResponsibility
Criminal prosecution remains the most severe sanction against either
deliberately destroying relevant documents or knowingly counseling such
destruction. Nevertheless, ethical penalties are occasionally imposed, and an
attorney advising the destruction of documents must consider the implications
of the A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code). 274 Although the
Code contains no single provision pertaining to alteration or destruction of
evidence, several ethical considerations and disciplinary rules provide in the
aggregate a scheme of ethical limitations on counseling document
275
destruction.
At a minimum, an attorney may not advise a client to destroy evidence
when such destruction would constitute a criminal offense. 276 Criminal
behavior is irrefutably unethical. On the other hand, an attorney may advise a
client to destroy documents when the client may do so legally. The complicated
questions arise when an attorney advises the client to perform an arguably illegal act. Often, the duty to obey the law clashes with ethical mandates or
privileges, leaving the attorney in a dilemma. Unfortunately, the Code offers
little guidance to attorneys confronting this dilemma since its provisions are
general and are inadequate in their treatment of difficult situations. Furthermore, although bar opinions or records of disciplinary actions might normally
serve to establish more specific standards of conduct, they fail to do so in this
area. The few reported disciplinary proceedings against attorneys tampering
277
with evidence typically involved egregious criminal conduct.
The Code's general provisions 278 and disciplinary rules279 prohibit counsel
from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. In conjunction with Canon 1, DR 7-102(7) provides that a lawyer shall
not counsel or assist his client in conduct known to be illegal or fraudulent. If
273
274

FED.

R. EvID. 803(6). See also 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 803(6), at 803-148 to 803-180 (1978).
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969) [hereinafter cited as ABA CODE] (replacing ABA
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908)). The Code has been adopted or followed in every state.
275 See Note, supra note 124.
276 See ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINION No. 1057 (1968) (disposition of
evidence given lawyer by client; ethical requirement to operate within legal bounds requires attorney to
comply with state statutes prohibiting suppression of evidence by not advising unlawful destruction).
277 See, e.g., In re Glass, 59 A.D.2d 248, 399 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1977) (attorney pleading guilty to conspiracy to
obstruct justice also disbarred, sentenced to two years' probation and $5,000 restitution); accord, Cin. Bar
Ass'n v. Leggett, 176 Ohio St. 281, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 196, 199 N.E.2d 590 (1964) (attorney convicted for advising the burning of records relevant to grand jury investigation, also suspended from practicing law indefinitely).
278

ABA CODE CANON 4.

279

ABA CODE Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4) [Disciplinary Rules hereinafter cited as DR].
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the client is involved in such activity, counsel's duties are delineated in Canon
7, which distinguishes past frauds from continuing and future illegal
activity.280
Under a literal reading of the pre-1974 Code, a lawyer learning of his
client's past fraudulent conduct was obliged to disclose the conduct if the client
refused to rectify the fraud. 281 In 1974 the Code was amended to provide that a
lawyer who obtained information establishing that his client had engaged in
fraudulent conduct was not obliged to disclose the fraud if the information was
protected as a privileged communication.2 82 However, if the lawyer received
the incriminating information in the form of a secret or confidential communication not protected by privilege, the Code appeared to mandate
disclosure. This subtle distinction required the lawyer to determine whether
the information was privileged in order to determine whether to reveal the
fraud. Since the scope of privilege is a question of law, not ethics, 28 3 the Code
appeared to force counsel to perform a judicial function.
The A.B.A. Professional Ethics Committee resolved this dilemma in a
1975 opinion. The Committee subordinated the lawyer's obligation to disclose
past frauds to his duty28 4 to preserve client secrets and confidences.2 85 Essentially, "secrets" and "confidences" were encompassed within the attorneyclient privilege.
Under the current ethical rules, an attorney who receives privileged information that his client has engaged in fraudulent conduct is not ethically
obligated to disclose the information. However, the fact that an attorney is not
required to disclose the misconduct does not license him to destroy records of
past impermissible activities. Although the Code does not establish any affirmative duty to disclose, it does provide that a lawyer should not "[c]onceal or
knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal." 286 This

280 ABA CODE Ethical Considerations 7-3, 7-5. For discussions of the conflicting duties regarding client
frauds, see, e.g., Gruenbaum, Clients' Frauds and Their Lawyers' Obligations:A Study in ProfessionalIrresponsibility,
67 GEo. L.J. 991 (1979); Hoffman, On Learningof a Corporate Client's Crime of Fraud-TheLawyer's Dilemma,
33 Bus. LAw. 1389 (March 1978 Special Issue); Shipman, supra note 124; Morgan, The Evolving Concept of
ProfessionalResponsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977); Note, Client Fraudandthe Lawyer-An EthicalAnalysis,
62 MINN. L. REV. 89 (1977); J. Fedders, Investigative Counsel's Vulnerability, Prac. L. Inst. Seminar on The
Internal Corporate Investigation, Course Materials at 209 (1980).
281 ABA CODE DR 7-102(B)(1), in its original form, stated:
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or
tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is
unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal.
282 The 1974 Code amendment provides that an attorney's duty to report frauds committed by a client
against a third party does not apply where it would require violating the rule of confidentiality stated in ABA
CODE CANON 4 (lawyer should preserve secrets and confidences of clients). Since the rule of confidentiality
prohibits disclosing anything of embarrassment to the client, the amendment "eviscerated the duty to report
fraud." G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 27 (1978).
283 See FED. R. EVID. 501 (questions of privilege governed by common law, absent Supreme Court rule,
federal statute or constitutional provision). For a comprehensive discussion of the historical evolution of the
attorney-client privilege see Hazard, An HistoricalPerspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV.
1061 (1978).
284 ABA CODE DR 4-10.
285

ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, FORMAL OPINION No. 341 (1975) (1974 amendment should be

extended to protect secrets and confidences of client from disclosure without regard to whether they would
be protected under attorney-client privilege).
286 ABA CODE DR 7-102(A)(3); accord, id., Ethical Consideration 7-27.
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provision reaffirms the general rule that a lawyer should not counsel or assist
287
his client in conduct the lawyer knows is illegal.
Different duties apply when counsel learns that his client is currently
engaged in or is contemplating fraudulent conduct. Confidential communications made to counsel to secure assistance in committing future criminal acts
are not privileged. 288 Although ample legal precedent supports this strict proposition, the ethical rules are more lenient. When a client personally pursues or
insists that his lawyer pursue an illegal course of conduct, the Code allows but
does not compel the lawyer to reveal the client's intention to commit the
289
crime.
Although a lawyer is free to conceal his client's illegal conduct, he may
risk exposure to personal liability if he does so. If the client is eventually prosecuted, the lawyer might be charged as a participant in the illegality if he knew
of the misconduct but took no preventive action. The attorney-client privilege
would not protect counsel since knowledge of the client's criminal intentions
abrogates the privilege. Yet disclosure of the information is an undesirable
course of action because it might divulge client confidences, which is independently improper. 290 The Code allows counsel in this position to withdraw
291
from the representation with the court's permission.
The Code also regulates an attorney's conduct once a trial has commenced. 292 No disciplinary rule specifically prohibits counsel from destroying
relevant evidence, although such conduct would clearly be culpable. DR
7-102(A)(6) prohibits a lawyer from participating in the creation or preservation of evidence which he knows to be false, but this rule probably does not extend to document tampering. Canon 7, however, when read in conjunction
with the Code's prohibition against concealing that which he is "required by
law to reveal,''293 such as subpoenaed documents, may sanction an attorney
287 ABA CODE DR 7-102(A)(7). The existence and scope of counsel's affirmative duty to disclose information received from clients is the subject of extensive commentary, particularly in connection with
criminal prosecutions, where counsel is privy to the location of concealed evidence. See, e.g., LAWYERS
ETHICS 145-82 (A. Gerson, ed., Transaction Books 1980); Pye, The Role of Counsel in the Suppression of Truth,
1978 DUKE LJ.921; Callan and David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of
Client Misconduct in Our Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332 (1976); Frankel, The Searchfor Truth: An
Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1975); Comment, In re Ryder: Can An Attorney Serve Two Masters?,
54 VA. L. REV. 145 (1968); Patterson, The Limits of the Lawyer's Discretionand the Law of Legal Ethics: National
Student MarketingRevisited, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1251. For the rare occasions where attorneys have been subject to
ethical sanctions for failure to disclose information see, e.g., Harkin v. Brundage, 13 F.2d 617, 620 (7th Cir.
1926) (failure to inform court of proceedings in second jurisdiction may lead to disbarment), rev'd on other
grounds, 276 U.S. 36 (1928); Sullins v. State Bar, 15 Cal. 3d 609, 542 P.2d 631, 125 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1975)
(suspension for requesting higher contingency fee to represent executor of estate without disclosing
beneficiaries' withdrawal four years earlier), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 937 (1976); Florida Bar v. Beaver, 248 So.
2d 477 (Fla. 1971) (suspension for advising client to conceal assets during divorce proceedings).
288 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d
326, 337 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 909 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
911 (1976); United States v. Billingsley, 440 F.2d 823, 827 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 909 (1971). See
also Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (Cardozo, J.) ("The privilege takes flight if the relation is
abused."); Hazard, supra note 283, at 1063 n.6 (abrogation of privilege for intended crimes dates back to
The Queen v. Cox & Railton, 14 Q.B. 153 (1884)).
289 ABA CODE DR 4-101(C)(3) states: "A lawyer may reveal... [t]he intention of his client to commit a
crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime."
290 ABA CODE DR 4-101(B)(1).
291 ABA CODE DR 2-110(C)(1)(b) and (c). Subsection (b) permits withdrawal where the client "seeks to
pursue an illegal course of conduct," while subsection (c) allows withdrawal if the client "insists that the
lawyer pursue a course of conduct that is illegal or that is prohibited under the Disciplinary Rules."
292 ABA CODE CANON 7 (attorney should represent client zealously within the bounds of law).
293 ABA CODE DR 7-102(A)(3).
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who advises a client to dispose of subpoenaed documents. As the duty to
disclose incriminating evidence continues to evolve, the range of evidence
counsel is "required by law to reveal" will likely expand beyond that which is
subpoenaed or requested in discovery.
A lawyer whose client informs him of an intention to destroy subpoenaed
documents should take all responsible steps to dissuade the client from such action. If counsel learns that the client or one of its employees destroyed relevant
documents after receipt of a subpoena, counsel must either report the destruction to the court or withdraw from the representation. As a practical matter, if
the client is a corporation and the destruction was undertaken by an employee,
counsel should first report the destruction to senior management and then to
the court and opposing counsel. Counsel then continues the representation at a
disadvantage due to the adverse inference that may be drawn from the destruction, and the employee is terminated.
B. A.B.A. Commission on Evaluation of ProfessionalStandards
Draft Model Rule 2.5; Alternative Proposals
In the past decade there has been a continuing inquiry into the meaning of
professionally responsible conduct. The inquiry has led to reconsideration of
the Code and to the appointment of an A.B.A. Commission on Evaluation of
Professional Standards (the Commission) which published in 1980 a discussion
draft of Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules).2 94 The Model
Rules constitute a comprehensive reformulation of A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility, and are presently undergoing thorough examination by
the legal profession and the public.
Recognizing that the present Code lacks any specific provision regarding
alteration or destruction of evidence, the Commission drafted Model Rule 2.5:
"A lawyer shall not advise a client to alter or destroy a document or other
material when the lawyer reasonably should know that the material is relevant
to a pending proceeding or one that is clearly foreseeable.' '295 The Model Rule
does not require a lawyer to foresee all possible uses of documentary material
and a lawyer may still give advice concerning a records destruction program.
The term "clearly foreseeable"
requires clarification. "Clearly
foreseeable" proceedings should be limited to those involving a specific con294 ABA COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, DISCUSSION DRAFT OF MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Jan. 30, 1980) [hereinafter cited as MODEL RULES].
295

The Commission's comment to Model Rule 2.5 states:
Documents and other items of evidence are often essential to establish a claim or defense.
Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing party, including the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or subpoena is an important procedural right. The exercise of
that right can be frustrated if a person alters or destroys material that could be demanded by an
opposing party. Applicable law in many jurisdictions makes it an offense to destroy material for
purpose of impairing its availability in a pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be

foreseen. Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal offense. In any event, it is improper for a
lawyer to advise a client deliberately to take steps that impair the legal rights of others.
The Rule applies to evidentiary material generally, including computerized information.
The Rule does not require a lawyer to foresee all possible uses of material and does not preclude
advice about a general policy concerning retention of records. It does preclude a lawyer from suggesting the destruction or falsification of specific material whose relevance can be foreseen in
pending or clearly foreseeable litigation. It also prohibits a lawyer from turning over such
material at the client's direction when the client plainly intends to destroy it.
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troversy between parties, and should exclude proceedings which are only a
possibility and "might" be foreseeable. 296 By including "clearly foreseeable as
well as pending proceedings, the rule would impose superior ethical requirements on counsel.
Whether a proceeding is "clearly foreseeable" is a question upon which
reasonable counsel might differ. If a potential claimant has manifested to
management or counsel an awareness of or a present intention to assert a possible claim, a proceeding is"clearly foreseeable." Furthermore, even though no
claimant has manifested such an awareness or intention, a proceeding is
"clearly foreseeable" if an event occurs upon which a claim could be premised
and which involves a catastrophe, accident or similar occurrence, such as an
airplane crash, so open and notorious that past experience would dictate that
one or more claims are reasonably likely to be asserted. However, it is questionable whether a proceeding is "clearly foreseeable" if no claimant manifests
an awareness of, or present intention to assert, a possible claim following required public disclosure acknowledging the existence of possible claims arising
out of an event or set of circumstances.
Under Model Rule 2.5 the actual knowledge requirement is replaced with
the objective standard of foreseeability, thereby subjecting an attorney to
297
disciplinary action despite his lack of personal knowledge.
Two professional organizations have proposed alternative rules of professional conduct in response to the Model Rules. The National Organization of
Bar Counsel (N.O.B.C.) objects to the Commission's proposed changes in the
format of the Code 298 and advocates revision of the Code without abandonment
of its present form and style. The N.O.B.C. would replace current DR
7-102(A)(3) 299 with a provision stating that a lawyer shall not "improperly
obstruct another party's access to evidence, destroy, falsify or conceal
evidence, or use illegal methods of obtaining evidence. ' 30 0 The N.O.B.C.
would also add a new subsection to DR 7-102 prohibiting a lawyer from
"[a]dvis[ing] a client to alter or destroy material evidence when the lawyer
knows or should know that the material may be relevant evidence in a pending
296 Members of one committee commenting on Model Rule 2.5 believed that it "should include a further affirmative obligation on the lawyer to advise a client not to destroy such documents where there is a
proceeding already pending," but the entire committee did not adopt this requirement. Id.
297 The Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of The Association of the Bar of the City of New
York suggests that the comment to Draft Model Rule 2.5 requires qualification. It observes that "[t]he first
sentence of the Comment refers to documents 'essential to establish a claim or defense,' but the third
sentence refers to 'material that could be demanded by an opposing party.' The latter standard appears to
require a lawyer to anticipate the kinds of broad and frequently tangential discovery demands which can be
made under discovery rules like Rules 26 and 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Committee's
view is that the standard of 'relevant' within the meaning of the Rule should be similar to that contained in
the first sentence of the Comment and thus embrace only documents that the lawyer can reasonably foresee
are clearly relevant to the issues in a pending proceeding or in a proceeding that is clearly foreseeable." THE
Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK, COMMITTEE.REPORTS COMMENTING ON THEJANUARY 30,1980
DISCUSSION DRAFT OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE ABA COMM'N ON EVALUATION
OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS

32 (July 1980).

298

NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF BAR COUNSEL, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON STUDY OF THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT TO THE ABA COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS 6

(Tent. Draft 1980).

299 "[A] lawyer shall not conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to
reveal. "
300 NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF BAR COUNSEL, supra note 290, Subsection (A)(3) of proposed rule DR
7-102 (Representing a Client Within the Bounds of the Law) at 52-57.
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proceeding or a proceeding that is reasonably foreseeable." 30 The N.O.B.C.'s
proposed "reasonable foreseeability" standard would be more restrictive than
the Commission's "clear foreseeability" standard, since many "reasonably"
likely proceedings would not be "clearly" likely. The N.O.B.C. proposal
would thus require great diligence in ascertaining whether proceedings are
"reasonably foreseeable" and whether specific documents "may be relevant
evidence." The N.O.B.C.'s proposal would likely prevent counsel from ever
recommending ad hoc destruction of business records, since in today's litigious
environment a variety of proceedings are "reasonably foreseeable."
The Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation (the Foundation) considers the Model Rules to make few improvements over the Code and
considers the Model Rules inferior to the Code in several significant respects.
The Foundation-appointed Commission on Professional Responsibility has
prepared and circulated for comment a new draft code. 302 Several of its proposed rules present in the aggregate a vague scheme of ethical limitations on
counseling document destruction. The Foundation's draft code includes one
provision, Rule 3.5, directly relevant to counseling the destruction of
documents. Rule 3.5 follows the Code's approach, providing that a lawyer
"shall not knowingly participate in unlawfully concealing or destroying
evidence, or discourage a witness or potential witness from talking to counsel
30 3
or another party."
The Foundation thus considers the legal and ethical obligations of counsel
regarding document destruction to be coextensive, whereas the Commission
and N.O.B.C. regard counsel's ethical obligations as exceeding present legal
requirements.
VII. The Nixon Tapes: An Illustration
The difficulties of interpreting the legal and ethical standards relating to
the destruction of relevant documents prior to their subpoena are illustrated by
examining the consequences that would have resulted if President Richard
Nixon had destroyed the tapes 304 after their existence was revealed on July 16,
1973 but before they had been subpoenaed by the Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities on July 23, 1973.305 Could the President have
destroyed the tapes without legal consequences prior to July 23? Would the
President's counsel have violated professional ethical standards if he had
recommended destruction prior to that date?
The question of culpability under the present obstruction of justice
statutes would have depended both on the time the tapes were destroyed and
the intent of the person destroying them. Clearly, to have intentionally
301

Id. at 53.

302 COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ROSCOE POUND-AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYER
FOUNDATION, THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT (Public Discussion Draft, June 1980).

303 Id. at 207.
304 WATERGATE: CHRONOLOGY OF A CRISIS, I CONG. Q. 192 (1973). The existence of a secret system to
record conversations in the White House and Executive Office Building during the Nixon administration
was revealed onJuly 16, 1973.

305 Id. at 210. The special prosecutor's April 18, 1974 subpoena for the tapes was upheld in United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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destroyed or to have counseled destruction of the tapes after they were subpoenaed on July 23 would have constituted either criminal contempt or
obstruction ofjustice, as well as a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility by counsel. Liability for intentional destruction of the tapes at any time
before July 23, however, would have depended upon whether the tapes were
relevant to a judicial, administrative or congressional investigation or proceeding and upon the actor's belief or knowledge about the possibility of legal
action. Was the actor's intent "corrupt"? The ethical implications for counsel
would have depended upon these legal consequences since advising the President to destroy the tapes would not have been unethical so long as such
destruction was not illegal.
One commentator suggests that if "there was a period when destruction
was legal, it was probably prior to March 26, 1973, the date when the grand
jury that indicted the original seven Watergate defendants reconvened to consider new charges." ' 30 6 However, a member of the special prosecutor's staff
believes that issuance of a subpoena, not just empanelment of the grand
jury, 30 7 was necessary to render destruction illegal. Former Attorney General
Richard Kleindienst is reported to have said President Nixon was "stupid" not
to have burned the tapes. Another attorney has said that he would have defended the President by "burning" the tapes; still others have suggested that they
would have had no ethical compunctions about advising destruction of the
3 08

tapes.

Whether an adverse evidentiary inference could have been drawn in a
civil proceeding from the destruction of the tapes would have depended on
whether the tapes were deliberately destroyed to prevent their use in litigation.
The adverse inference could only have arisen if the destruction were accompanied by intentional conduct indicating fraud and a desire to suppress truth.
Obviously, arguments could have been made to rebut the negative inference.
Whether criminal liability could have been imposed for the intentional
destruction of the tapes had the tampering with physical evidence provisions in
S. 1722 and H.R. 6915 been law is also uncertain. Section 1325 of S. 1722 requires the actus reus element of tampering with physical evidence and three interrelated mens rea elements, namely, a specific intent to impair the "integrity"
or "availability" of the evidence for use in an official proceeding, knowledge
that an official proceeding is "pending or likely to be instituted," and an
awareness of tampering with a particular document. The parallel provision in
H.R. 6915, section 1725, establishes a narrower standard for culpability,
criminalizing destruction only if done with the intent to impair use of evidence
"in an official proceeding that is pending.." Under either provision, it may
have been illegal to have intentionally and knowingly destroyed the tapes after
the grand jury that indicted the original seven Watergate defendants reconvened on March 26.
Would counsel have violated any of the three proposed ethical standards
relating to destruction of evidence by recommending destruction of the tapes
after March 26 orJuly 16 but beforeJuly 23? The answer depends upon which
306
307
308

Note, supra note 124, at 1665 n.3.
R. BEN-VENISTE, STONEWALL 112 (1977).
Note, supra note 124, at 1665 n.4.
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standard is applied. The N.O.B.C.'s proposed rule, forbidding counsel from
advising destruction of material that "may be relevant evidence in a proceeding that is reasonably foreseeable," would have prohibited destruction of
the tapes any time after March 26. The "clearly foreseeable" test in the Commission's Model Rule 2.5 also would have been violated by destruction after
July 16, and possibly as early as March 26. Whether the Foundation's proposed ethical standard relating to destruction of evidence would have been
violated by destruction prior to July 23 would depend on whether the conduct
was unlawful, since this standard regards counsel's legal and ethical obligations as coextensive.
VIII. Conclusion
In light of the expanding legal requirements imposed on business entities
to retain documents for various periods of time, an increasing number of companies have recognized the practical and legal necessity of a comprehensive
records management program. As business documents proliferate, the adoption and proper administration of such a program have become essential to the
cost-efficient operation of a company and to the avoidance of practical, legal
and ethical difficulties.
Companies which adopt records management programs, however, confront difficult legal and ethical questions regarding, first, continuing ad hoc
search and destroy operations, and second, the timing of suspensions of routine
document destruction programs in the face of "reasonably" or "clearly"
foreseeable or pending investigations or proceedings. Beyond doubt, federal
criminal statutes and the Code of Professional Responsibility are violated if
management and counsel agree to destroy relevant documents after process requiring their production has been served. Furthermore, great risk of violation
arises if management and counsel agree to destroy relevant documents in the
course of voluntary cooperation with government authorities, or upon learning
indirectly of relevant government inquiry. Many other actions by management
and counsel, both intentional and inadvertent, give rise to the possibility of
criminal and ethical sanctions.
For these reasons, what once was a simple business decision to destroy obsolete or seemingly inconsequential documents has become a senior management concern deserving serious and thoughtful attention. Lawyers must be
prepared to assist business clients in responding to the continually enlarging
sphere of difficulties surrounding the destruction of documents. The possible
legal, practical and ethical consequences of document destruction are vast, and
the issue of records management may soon occupy an important place at every
level of every business enterprise. As sophisticated solutions emerge to resolve
filing, storage and retrieval problems, new difficulties will arise requiring
prompt resolution. Because the issues are only now being addressed, the area
of records management is certain to remain a challenging and salient topic so
long as businesses continue to generate massive numbers of documents.

